is given to the source. Long-Run Impacts of Unions on Firms: New Evidence from Financial Markets, 1961-1999 by David Lee et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
LONG-RUN IMPACTS OF UNIONS ON FIRMS:
NEW EVIDENCE FROM FINANCIAL MARKETS, 1961-1999
David Lee
Alexandre Mas
Working Paper 14709
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14709
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
February 2009
We thank Jonathan Berk, David Card, John DiNardo, Lawrence Katz, Morris Kleiner, Robert Moffitt,
Jesse Rothstein, Eric Verhoogen, Hans-Joachim Voth, and numerous seminar participants for helpful
suggestions. Emily Buchsbaum, Mariana Carrera, Elizabeth Debraggio, Briallen Hopper, Sanny Liao,
Xiaotong Niu, Zhuan Pei, Andrew Shelton, and Fanyin Zheng provided outstanding research assistance.
We gratefully acknowlege research support from the Center for Economic Policy Studies at Princeton
University. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
© 2009 by David Lee and Alexandre Mas. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice,
is given to the source.Long-Run Impacts of Unions on Firms: New Evidence from Financial Markets, 1961-1999
David Lee and Alexandre Mas
NBER Working Paper No. 14709
February 2009
JEL No. J01,J08,J5,J51
ABSTRACT
We estimate the effect of new unionization on firms' equity value over the 1961-1999 period using
a newly assembled sample of National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) representation elections matched
to stock market data. Event-study estimates show an average union effect on the equity value of the
firm equivalent to a cost of at least $40,500 per unionized worker. At the same time, point estimates
from a regression-discontinuity design -- comparing the stock market impact of close union election
wins to close losses -- are considerably smaller and close to zero. We find a negative relationship between
the cumulative abnormal returns and the vote share in support of the union, allowing us to reconcile
these seemingly contradictory findings. Using the magnitudes from the analysis, we calibrate a structural
"median voter" model of endogenous union determination in order to conduct counterfactual policy
simulations of policies that would marginally increase the ease of unionization.
David Lee
Industrial Relations Section
Firestone Library
Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 08544
and NBER
davidlee@princeton.edu
Alexandre Mas
Industrial Relations Section
Firestone Library
Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 08544
and NBER
amas@haas.berkeley.edu“[L]aymen and economists alike tend, in my view, to exaggerate greatly the extent to which
labor unions affect the structure and level of wage rates.” – Milton Friedman, 19501
“Everyone ‘knows’ that unions raise wages. The questions are how much, under what condi-
tions, and with what effects on the overall performance of the economy.” – Richard Freeman
and James Medoff, 19842
1 Introduction
Itis undisputed that employers oppose unions, viewing them as athreat toproﬁtability. An example receiving
recent national attention is Wal-Mart’s effort to resist unionization – from its strategic location of stores in
areas less favorable to unions to its hard-line stance against organization (Basker, 2007). According to
a handbook the retailer distributed to its managers, “Staying union free is a full-time commitment...The
commitment to stay union free must exist at all levels of management – from the Chairperson of the “Board”
down to the front-line manager....”3 It is easy to ﬁnd isolated cases that conﬁrm the fears of employers like
Wal-Mart. For example, in a March 1999 National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) representation election,
workers at National Linen Service (NLS) Corp., a large linen supplier, voted by an over 2 to 1 margin to
organize as a local chapter of the Union of Needletrades, Industrial, and Textile Employees (UNITE). The
stock market response appeared to punish NLS in a severe, though perhaps not swift, fashion. Figure 1
shows the cumulative return of NLS’ stock for the two years prior to and following the election, as well
as the cumulative return of a broad market index over the same period. Before the election, the returns for
NLS and the market tracked each other quite closely. But immediately following the election, NLS began
to lag. By March 2001, the price of NLS shares had fallen by 25 percent, while the broad market index had
increased by 50 percent.
How general is this phenomenon? Is NLS the exception or the rule? Despite an enormous literature
documenting numerous aspects of unions and their role in the labor market, the magnitude of an “average”
effect of unions on ﬁrm performance throughout the economy remains somewhat unclear.
Empirically, there are at least three reasons why measuring these effects is quite challenging. First, large-
scale establishment or ﬁrm-level micro-data containing the relevant information on the extent of unionization
1See Friedman (1950).
2See Freeman and Medoff (1984).
3Quoted in Featherstone (2004).
1are not readily available. Second, even when such data are available, omitted variables and the endogeneity
of unionization at the ﬁrm-level makes it difﬁcult to separate causal effects from other unobserved con-
founding factors. Third, it is difﬁcult to ﬁnd data that can also be plausibly representative of the population
of unionized companies in the United States.
Furthermore, from a theoretical standpoint, it is not obvious to what degree unions should affect ﬁrms.
One view, articulated by Friedman (1950), is that workers would reject substantially above-market wages,
knowing full well that such wages could adversely affect job security. Unions, after taking these considera-
tions into account, would tend to moderate wage demands.4 Moreover, ﬁrms may respond to a unionization
threat by conceding higher wages and better working conditions. Accounting for these forces suggests a
reduction in the gap in compensation and working conditions between union and non-union workforces, at
least in situations where there is a threat of unionization. The possibility that unions may temper their de-
mands because of electoral pressure may help explain the results of DiNardo and Lee (2004), who found
generally small differences in wages, employment, and output between unionized and otherwise comparable
non-unionized workplaces in close representation elections.
In this paper, we ﬁrst assess the extent to which the pattern in Figure 1 is a generalizable phenomenon,
measuring an average overall effect of unionization among publicly-traded ﬁrms. To do so, we begin with a
sample frame that is the universe of all ﬁrms with NLRB union representation elections between 1961-1999.
Since a large number of unionized workplaces in the U.S. come into existence via a secret-ballot election
on the question of representation, this population provides a reasonable representation of newly unionized
workplaces and, to the extent they survive, the future stock of unions in the United States.
We begin analyzing the stock market reaction to union victories using event-study methodologies. The
most distinctive feature of our data – crucial for our research design – is the long panel (up to 48 months
before and after the election) of high-frequency data on stock market returns for each ﬁrm. This feature
allows us to use the pre-event data to test the adequacy of the benchmarks used to predict the counterfactual
returns in the post-event period. The long panel also allows us to examine returns several months beyond
the event, so as to capture the long-run expected effects of new unions, without having to rely heavily on the
assumption that the stock price immediately and instantaneously adjusts to capture the expected presence of
the unions.
Our event-study analysis reveals substantial losses in market value following a union election victory –
4It is this line of reasoning that led to Friedman’s view that the impact of wages was exaggerated (Friedman, 1950).
2about a 10 percent decline, equivalent to about $40,500 per unionized worker. The evidence supporting this
ﬁnding is compelling: we ﬁnd that these ﬁrms’ average returns are quite close to the predicted returns every
month leading up to the election, but at precisely at the time of the election, the actual and counterfactual
returns diverge. The results for these ﬁrms are robust to a number of different speciﬁcations. In the sample of
ﬁrms where we know that the union is a small fraction of the workforce, we do not ﬁnd a similar divergence
of returns from the benchmark. Notably, while the equity value of ﬁrms unionizing begins diverging at the
time of the election, the full effect takes approximately 18 months to fully materialize. This slow speed of
adjustment is consistent with a number of studies showing that over horizons of 3 to 12 months share prices
underreact to bad news (Hong et al., 2000).
The event-study estimate appears to average a great deal of heterogeneity in the effects. We additionally
employ a Regression Discontinuity (RD) design, implicitly comparing close union victories to close union
losses, and consistent with DiNardo and Lee (2004), we ﬁnd little evidence of a signiﬁcant discontinuous
relationship between the vote share and market returns. If anything, the RD point estimates show a 4 percent
positive (though statistically insigniﬁcant) effect of union certiﬁcation (vis-a-vis union defeat). The event-
study estimates vary systematically by the observed vote share, with the largest negative abnormal returns
for cases where the union won the election by a large margin.
We use our estimates to make predictions for the effects of policies that lower the threshold for new
unionization, such as the recently proposed Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA). To do so while also incor-
porating unions’ and ﬁrms’ responses to the new policy requires modeling their behavior and interactions.
We choose as our framework a two-party model of electoral competition, where the ﬁrm and the union are
each seeking to win the sympathies of the “median” voter in an NLRB election. As is standard in this class of
models, despite having opposing interests, the two parties may be forced to propose a level of compensation,
(accompanied by a risk of job loss), that is closer to the preferences of the median voter.
Within this framework, which is reminiscent of Friedman’s view, the RD design estimate of the union-
ization effect identiﬁes the gap between the union’s and ﬁrm’s proposals for workplaces where the median
voter has moderate demands. Depending on how aggressively ﬁrms and unions court voters, this gap could
be close to zero, even if on average – including both small and large electoral victories – unions signiﬁcantly
affect the proﬁtability of ﬁrms. Viewed through the lens of this model, the pattern of results imply that voters
have a strong desire for higher wages (or better working conditions) in a relatively small number of elec-
tions. Overall, our policy simulation exercise suggests that a policy-induced increase in the win rate from 33
3to 70 percent would lead to a 4.3 percent decline in market value, averaged across all ﬁrms (including ﬁrms
that unionize under the new policy, as well as those that remain nonunion). For a more dramatic policy that
increases the win rate from 33 to nearly 99 percent, the estimate is a decline of about 11 percent averaged
across all ﬁrms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy highlights what is known from
the literature and how our study relates to those ﬁndings. We provide some institutional details in Section
3 that are relevant to our research design, which we describe along with our data. We present and discuss
the empirical results in Section 4. In Section 5 we present a structural model, which we then use to conduct
counterfactual policy simulations. Section 6 concludes.
2 Existing Literature and Background
In this section we provide a brief overview of the literature most relevant to our analysis. First, there is an
enormous union wage premium literature, discussed and summarized in the landmark works of Freeman and
Medoff (1984) and Lewis (1986), with more recent evidence discussed in Blanchﬂower and Bryson (2007).
These studies typically use household-level survey data to compute the wages for workers who are union
members, comparing them to “otherwise comparable” non-union members. In some cases, these studies
track workers in longitudinal data sets, as they switch from union to non-union status. In their analysis,
Freeman and Kleiner (1990) note that these “[e]stimates based on longitudinal data...contrast workers who
change union status by moving to or from already organized workplaces rather than contrasting workers in
plants that are newly organized with those in plants that remain non-union.” Expanding upon this point,
DiNardo and Lee (2004) clearly state that the effect of unionization (changing a workplace from non-union
to union) is distinct from the effect of moving a worker from a non-unionized to a unionized workplace. In
particular, a “typical” unionized workplace may differ from a “typical” non-unionized workplace along a
number of dimensions (e.g. geography, ﬁrm size, industry), which may independently inﬂuence wage levels.
We therefore view this well-established literature as fundamentally unable to account for the selection of
unionism at the ﬁrm- or establishment-level, and thus potentially estimating something quite distinct from
the causal effect of unionizing a workplace.
Next, there is a literature utilizing ﬁrm- or establishment-level data with information on union status.
As discussed in Hirsch (2007), a recent study reviewing this evidence, there are a number of important
4reasons warranting caution when drawing inferences from the existing research. First, there can be important
omitted variables – unobserved determinants of the long-run viability of the ﬁrm that could be correlated
with the presence of the union. Related, there is a potential endogeneity problem, whereby unions may
speciﬁcally target a highly proﬁtable ﬁrm for organization. Alternatively, it may be that poorly managed,
and thus low-performing, ﬁrms lead to the demand for worker representation. Examples of studies implicitly
relying on the assumption that union status is an exogenous variable include the in-depth analyses of Clark
(1984), Hirsch (1991a), and Hirsch (1991b). A second limitation Hirsch (2007) emphasizes is the limited
generalizability of many of the studies. For example, the cement industry is examined in Clark (1980a) and
Clark (1980b), hospitals and nursing homes in Allen (1986a), the construction industry in Allen (1986b), the
trucking industry in Rose (1987), and sawmills in Mitchell and Stone (1992). It is difﬁcult to extrapolate the
ﬁndings on productivity from these studies to a broader, representative cross-section of ﬁrms in the United
States. Indeed, our analysis is largely motivated by the belief that it might be easy to ﬁnd particular incidents
and/or companies where unions have imposed large costs on ﬁrms. The challenge, however, is determining
to what extent isolated examples (such as the one illustrated in Figure 1) generalize to a broader population
of interest.
Finally, there are three particular studies that we consider to be most closely related to our analysis:
Lalonde et al. (1996), Ruback and Zimmerman (1984), and DiNardo and Lee (2004). We believe our analysis
addresses some of the most important limitations of each of these studies.
The main difﬁculty faced in Lalonde et al. (1996) – which utilizes a “ﬁxed effects” approach with
establishment-level panel data from the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD) to examine the impact of
a successful union organizing campaign – is one of interpretation. The study shows some differences in
employment growth between the eventually successful and failed organizing attempts prior to the election
event. For example, one sample shows an expanding gap in employment, while another shows a contracting
gap. Overall, the estimates and standard errors are consistent with pre-election employment growth dif-
ferences ranging from -10 to 14 percent. As a result, Lalonde et al. (1996) are careful to note that their
examination of pre-election growth rates for many of the outcome variables proved “inconclusive,” and that
their “subsequent ﬁndings on the effects of unionization may be too large.” Essentially, the main problem is
that the data they examine are not rich enough to rigorously test their “difference-in-difference” speciﬁcation
with the pre-event data, and as a result more caution is required in interpreting the post-event patterns.5
5Another study in the spirit of a “before-after” design is that of Freeman and Kleiner (1990), in which 203 establishments
5A similar issue arises in the well-known study of Ruback and Zimmerman (1984), which, like our anal-
ysis, examines the stock market reaction to NLRB union certiﬁcation events.6 There, the main estimates
of a 3.8 percent drop in stock market valuation is computed within a few months surrounding the unioniza-
tion event.7 Again, the difﬁculty in interpretation arises from the substantial negative abnormal returns that
emerge well before the unionization event; speciﬁcally, a decline in market value of about 7 percent between
the 12th and 7th months preceding unionization. While Ruback and Zimmerman (1984) have no explanation
for this signiﬁcant decline, they argue that it is unlikely to indicate anticipation of the outcome of the election
due to its timing.8 This pattern raises the question of whether the post-election decline in the stock market
valuation reﬂects unionization or the factors which led to the pre-election trend in the ﬁrst place.
In our analysis, we address these ambiguities by taking advantage of a very long panel of monthly data
on stock returns, using an arguably more disciplined approach to modeling the counterfactual “no union”
state. Speciﬁcally, we use the data from 24 months prior to the event and just before the event to test our
speciﬁcation. If there are signiﬁcant departures between our predicted returns and the observed returns
over the two year period before the event, we consider any estimates obtained from the post-event data to
be invalid.9 This approach is a direct application of conventional testing of over-identifying restrictions
for “difference-in-difference” modeling in labor economics program evaluation.10 Furthermore, we track
abnormal returns over a period of at least 24 months after the unionization. Strictly speaking, perfectly
efﬁcient ﬁnancial markets imply that any changes in valuation caused by the outcome of the election that are
known to investors will be fully capitalized into the stock price by the time the outcome of the election is
were surveyed before and after NLRB elections took place and were compared to 161 “control” ﬁrms (where elections did not
take place). In the study, there was only one period before and one period after, so testing the over-identifying restrictions of the
difference-in-difference design was not possible.
6There are a number of other studies that examine various aspects of unions through stock market reactions. They typically
do not aim to generate effects of unionization (versus the absence of unions), as they use samples of already unionized ﬁrms or
industries. See Abowd (1989), Becker and Olson (1986), Neumann (1990), DiNardo and Hallock (2002), and Becker (1987). Olson
and Becker (1990) is an exception in this regard, as it examines the impact of the passage of the National Labor Relations Act on 75
ﬁrms that were at risk of being unionized in the 1930s.
7Speciﬁcally, the main estimate of -3.84 percent is computed by taking the one-month change associated with the petition date
and adding it to the one-month change associated with the date of the actual certiﬁcation. This can be seen as the summation of the
third and ﬁfth rows, which equals the ﬁrst row of the third column in their Table 2. Their main estimate can also be seen in their
Figure 1(c) as the summation of the two downward notches around the petition and certiﬁcation dates.
8Speciﬁcally, on p.1145, they note that “[t]he abnormal return for these ﬁrms in the 6 months immediately preceding the petition
is 0.16 percent. This timing suggests that the pre-petition abnormal returns are not due to unionization. Instead, the results suggest
that ﬁrms in which unions are successful experienced declines in value prior to the union activity.”
9An alternative interpretation of pre-election divergence in the predicted and actual returns is the diffusion of anticipatory infor-
mation regarding the election outcome. Recognizing this alternative, we allow for non-zero excess returns in a short window prior
to the event, but conclude that any signiﬁcant divergence over a long-period of time prior to the event is evidence of a mis-speciﬁed
model.
10For example, see Ashenfelter and Card (1982) and Heckman and Hotz (1989).
6revealed. Nevertheless, our approach relies less on the assumption of instantaneous adjustment by examining
the patterns of returns for many months following unionization, thus allowing time for the market to adjust.
The ﬁnal closely related study is the regression discontinuity analysis of union elections, using data
from the LRD, in DiNardo and Lee (2004). They exploit the “near-experiment” generated by secret ballot
elections, comparing establishments where unions became recognized by a close margin of the vote with
workplaces where the union barely lost. The most precise estimates in that study are those on wages: wage
increases of 2 percent could be statistically ruled out as far away as seven years after the election.11 There
are a number of important limitations to inferring the long-run costs of unions from this evidence. For one, it
may take a much longer period of time – perhaps a decade or more – for unions to establish enough support
within the workplace to have the required bargaining power to negotiate for substantially higher wages.
Secondly, unions impose other costs that are not measured by the LRD, such as the use of seniority rules,
work rules, grievance procedures, and other working conditions speciﬁed in union contracts. In principal, our
approach in this paper of examining the effect of stock market valuation addresses both of these concerns: if
the market correctly prices the ﬁrm, it should capture the sum of all costs imposed by the union, and effects
that might occur many years in the future should be capitalized into the stock market valuation of the ﬁrm in
the short-run.
Aﬁnalimportant limitation isthat byestimating adiscontinuity inthe relationship between wages andthe
vote share at the 50 percent threshold, the RD analysis can only estimate a weighted average treatment effect,
where the weights are proportional to the ex ante likelihood an election was predicted to be “close.”12 That
is, among the observed close elections, a disproportionately small number would have had the fundamentals
of strong union support. The RD is fundamentally unable to provide a counterfactual for the set of elections
where workers voted 90 percent in favor of unionization. By contrast, the present analysis seeks to estimate
effects for precisely these “inframarginal cases.” In the analysis we describe below, we present results from
both an event-study as well as an RD approach, and provide a framework for interpreting both sets of results.
11Interestingly, the magnitudes are also in line with what was found on wages in Lalonde et al. (1996). Freeman and Kleiner
(1990) also ﬁnd wage effects that are much smaller than those found in cross-sectional worker-level studies.
12For a detailed discussion of this interpretation, see Lee (2008).
73 Institutional Background, Data, and Research Design
The National Labor Relations Act provides the legal framework by which most workers in the United States
become unionized. Workers who organize into unions through the procedures speciﬁed by the NLRA are
guaranteed the right to bargain collectively. There are several ways a group of workers may become union-
ized under the auspices of the NLRA, though it is believed that most new unionization occurs through rep-
resentation elections (Farber and Western, 2001). There are several steps involved in this process, which are
described in detail in DiNardo and Lee (2004). Brieﬂy, when a group of workers decides to organize, they
ﬁrst petition the NLRB to hold a representation election. To be legally granted an election, the petition must
be signed by at least 30 percent of the workforce, typically over no longer than a six month period. Once the
NLRB determines the appropriate bargaining unit, it holds an election at the work site. The union wins the
election with a simple majority of support amongst the workers. Barring objections by the employer, a win
means the union is certiﬁed as the exclusive bargaining agent for the unit and that the employer is legally
required to bargain with the union in good faith.
Our research design and subsequent data collection were motivated by our desire to estimate the average
effect of union victories and losses in representation elections on ﬁrm proﬁtability, and to attempt to address
some of the aforementioned puzzles and challenges in the literature. In collecting the data our goal was to
obtain information on the proﬁtability of ﬁrms over a long time span, with a panel structure allowing for an
event-study design with a long event window. Our sample size needed to be large enough so we could also
estimate the cross-sectional relationship between post-event abnormal returns and the union vote share. For
these reasons, and because we were also interested in how the union effect evolved over time, we sought to
collect information on elections over as many years as possible. Since data on the proﬁts of privately held
ﬁrms are difﬁcult to come by, we focused on publicly traded ﬁrms for which stock market information and
other performance measures are available through mandatory disclosure.
3.1 Data Set Assembly
This study primarily uses three sources of data: election results from the NLRB, data from the Center for
Research on Security Prices (CRSP), and the CRSP/Compustat Industrial Quarterly Merged Database.
The NLRB began publicly reporting representation election vote tallies in 1961. However, previous
studies using NLRB election data typically used records that were already in electronic form (e.g. Farber
8and Western, 2001; DiNardo and Lee, 2004; and Holmes, 2006). We use those data for the 1977-1999 period,
but augment those with data from 1961-1976 that wedigitized for this study.13 Datafor the 1961-1976 period
were hand-entered from hard copies of NLRB monthly election reports. Among other things, the NLRB
data set contains the number of voters who voted in favor of the union, the number of voters voting against
the union, the number of eligible voters, the name of the company, a two digit industry code, the city and
state of the election, and the month that the NLRB closed the election.14 The CRSP and Compustat data
were obtained from Wharton Research Data Services.
The primary objective of the data assembly process was to match companies in the NLRB election ﬁles
to companies in the CRSP data ﬁle. The procedure for matching establishments in NLRB dataset to ﬁrms
in the CRSP dataset is detailed in the Data Appendix. This matching process is complex because while the
NLRB ﬁle provides the company name where the election took place, most other identifying information is
unknown.15,16 However, as explained in the Appendix, we are conﬁdent that the match is high quality.
Previous event studies of representation elections use samples of elections with a very large number of
eligible voters. Ruback and Zimmerman (1984) and Bronars and Deere (1990) limit their sample to elections
with at least 750 eligible voters. Elections of this size are quite rare, thereby resulting in small sample sizes
(54 union victories in the main sample of Ruback and Zimmerman, 1984). We believe that the effects of
these elections are easier to detect if the number of eligible voters is large relative to the size of the ﬁrm.
However, limiting the sample to large elections is neither necessary nor sufﬁcient to achieve this objective.
Because many of these elections take place in very large ﬁrms, the ratio of voters to total ﬁrm employment is
no larger here than for moderately sized elections. While we do not have the exact sample used by Ruback
and Zimmerman (1984), we can attempt to replicate it based on their description of the sample selection
scheme.17,18 Using their sample selection scheme we ﬁnd that in more than 10 percent of the elections, less
13The 1977-1999 period data were obtained from Thomas Holmes’ website (http://www.econ.umn.edu/~holmes/data/geo_spill/)
and are used in Holmes (2006).
14For a limited number of years the NLRB data has information on the calendar date of the election and the calendar date the
NLRB closed the case.
15The location of the election is not very useful for matching because the CRSP ﬁle only contains the location of company
headquarters, which may differ from the location of any establishment undergoing a recognition election.
16The only additional information that could help us identify a match is the two digit SIC industry code of the establishment.
However, the industry of an establishment may differ from the primary industry of the ﬁrm. This variable is more useful as a check
for the validity of the matches.
17We contacted Professors Ruback and Zimmerman to request their dataset. As their paper was published more than 20 years
ago they understandably could no longer provide it.
18Using the Ruback and Zimmerman procedure we ended up with almost twice as many elections as they had considered over
the same time period. The only information that Ruback and Zimmerman had that we do not is the petition date. They excluded
electionswherethepetitiondatewasunavailable. Wetherefore inferthat thisexclusion restrictionwouldhaveresulted inusdropping
50 percent of the elections in the sample.
9than 1 percent of the ﬁrm’s workforce voted. In our reproduction of their sample, the median percentage
of the workforce voting in an election is 5 percent.19 By contrast, our main analysis limits the sample to
elections where at least 5 percent of the total workforce voted.20 The median election in our sample consists
of 13 percent of the company’s workforce voting (mean = 22 percent).21 Therefore, our sample selection
scheme not only provides us with elections that are relatively salient for a given ﬁrm (or, at a minimum,
excludes those elections which are clearly not salient), but also yields a substantially larger sample size
compared to what we would have obtained using the Ruback and Zimmerman (1984) criterion. Our baseline
sample is almost eight times larger than the Ruback and Zimmerman (1984) sample.
We present summary statistics of ﬁrm characteristics in Table 1. Columns (1) and (2) correspond to
elections where at least 5 percent of the workforce voted (hereafter the “≥ 5% sample”) for UV (“Union
Victory”) and UL (“Union Loss”) ﬁrms respectively. Columns (3) and (4) correspond to elections where
less than 5 percent of the workforce voted (hereafter the “< 5% sample”) for UV and UL ﬁrms respectively.
We report the market value of the ﬁrm using both the CRSP and the Compustat databases. Because there are
a large number of missing observations in the Compustat database, especially before 1970, these measures
differ. Companies in the Compustat database have larger market values on average, implying that small ﬁrms
are underrepresented in the Compustat dataset.
Looking at the ﬁrst row of Table 1, there are about twice as many elections in the < 5% sample than in
the ≥ 5% sample, and in both samples there are about twice as many ﬁrms where the union lost than where
the union won. Not surprisingly, ﬁrms in the ≥ 5% sample tend to be substantially smaller than ﬁrms in
the < 5% sample. This inference can be made by comparing a variety of measures, including employment
(4,530 vs.73,223 employees) and market value ($338 million vs. $5.9 billion in 1998 dollars, using the
more broadly available CRSP measure). However, the ≥ 5% sample corresponds to bigger elections, with
an average of 453 workers voting as compared to an average of 291 in the < 5% sample.
In addition to the mean and standard deviation, for variables derived from the Compustat database we
report in braces the average percentile rank of that variable relative to all other ﬁrms in the Compustat
database for the year and quarter of election. The average percentile rank is convenient for assessing how the
19Huth and MacDonald (1990) conduct an event-study of decertiﬁcation elections. Their sample selection scheme involves all
decertiﬁcation elections involving at least 250 workers between June 1977 and May 1987. They also do not condition on there being
a sufﬁciently high fraction of a ﬁrm’s workers involved in the election. Our (inexact) reproduction of their sample has a median
fraction of the workplace voting of 2 percent, with approximately 30 percent of elections in the sample involving less than 1 percent
of the company’s workforce.
20Total employment in the year of the election is from the Compustat annual ﬁles.
21We do not use elections where employment information is missing.
10ﬁrms in our sample compare to companies in the Compustat universe, and is advantageous as a statistic that
is "robust" to outliers. From the percentile rankings it can be seen that ﬁrms in the < 5% sample tend to be
around the 75th percentile in the size distribution of all Compustat companies, whereas ﬁrms in the ≥ 5%
sample are, on average, in the 35th percentile. In both samples, ﬁrms tend to be fairly representative with
respect to proﬁt margins, return on assets, Tobin’s Q, and the dividend ratio. At the time of the election, UL
and UV ﬁrms appear to be similar in most measures, including employment, market value, proﬁt margin,
proﬁt per employee, Tobin’s average Q, and industry composition.
Table 1 also shows the delisting rate for companies. We report the fraction of companies delisted in
the two years before or after the election. UV ﬁrms are slightly more likely to delist than UL ﬁrms (10
versus 8 percent delisting rates respectively).22 While this difference is not large, we will consider several
approaches to address this issue, as well as the presence of missing returns more generally. These approaches
involve imputing missing returns, estimating all models excluding periods with missing returns, or limiting
the sample to ﬁrms that have no missing returns in the event window. Simply excluding missing values
has the disadvantage that some of the changes in cumulative returns over time may reﬂect ﬁrms that are
entering or dropping out of the sample. Using a balanced panel has the advantage that we can be sure that
any differences over time are not caused by compositional differences. However, a balanced panel does
involve discarding a large number of elections and implies that inclusion into the sample may depend on the
realization of the dependent variable. We will demonstrate that the results are not sensitive to the approach
employed.
3.2 The Event-Study Method
Our objective is to assess the impact of union elections on the stock market value of ﬁrms. Ideally, we would
like to compare the ﬁrm’s stock returns to the returns the ﬁrm would have experienced in the absence of a
union organizing event. The event-study method provides a framework for estimating this counterfactual
return.
As is standard in ﬁnancial economics literature, we deﬁne the abnormal return as the difference between
a stock’s actual return and the expected return given market conditions. For the company corresponding to
22We deﬁne delisting as any company with a non-missing delisting return in the CRSP dataset.
11union representation election i, in month t, the abnormal return is:
ARit ≡ rit −E[rit|Xt],
where rit is the actual return and E[rit|Xt] is the predicted return. For this study, rit is the CRSP monthly
holding-period return including distributions, which is constructed using prices that are adjusted for splits
and distributions.23
For convenience, we express time in terms of months relative to the event:
ARit ≡ rit −E[rit|Xt],
where ARit is the abnormal return of the security corresponding to election i in the t’th month relative to
the event.
Because returns of companies with unionization events may vary systematically before the elections, per-
haps due to anticipation of the event, and because the market may not react instantaneously, we are interested
in the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) in a window surrounding the election. The CAR corresponding to
event i between months T1 and T2 relative to the event is:
CAR(T1,T2)i ≡
T2
å
t=T1
ARit.
The statistic of interest is the average (across N ﬁrms in the sample) cumulative abnormal return:
ACAR(T1,T2) ≡
1
N
N
å
i=1
CAR(T1,T2)i.
We will present the average cumulative abnormal return for the set of union victory (UV) and union loss
(UL) ﬁrms beginning two years prior to the election. Our decision to use such a long event window is in
part the consequence of having information on the month that the NLRB closed the case, rather than the
exact calendar date. By considering a very long pre-event window we can verify that any difference in the
cumulative return of the UL and UV ﬁrms and any counterfactual (or “benchmark”) portfolio is not simply a
23When stocks are delisted we use CRSP delisting returns. We replace missing returns with the predicted return (E[rit|Xt]) in
order to mitigate survivorship bias, though the results are not sensitive to how missing values are treated. Speciﬁcally, the results are
not sensitive to simply ignoring missing values, nor to only selecting companies with no missing returns in the entire event-period.
12continuation of differential pre-event trends. The long panel also allows us to examine returns in the months
beyond the event, so as to capture the long-run expected costs to the ﬁrm without having to rely on the
assumption that the stock price immediately and instantaneously adjusts to the presence of the union.
A critical decision in event-studies is how to model E[rit|Xt]. In traditional short-run event-studies the
counterfactual is often estimated from a market-model ﬁt to historical data (as described, for example, in
Campbell et al., 1997). In this approach, denoting Rmt as the return of a broad market index in month t, one
uses historical data to estimate:
E[rit|Xt] = ai+biRmt (1)
This approach is theoretically attractive because the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) predicts that
market beta is sufﬁcient to describe cross-sectional expected returns. While this choice of benchmark is
theoretically justiﬁed, a voluminous literature has discredited this idea (see Fama, 1998 for a review), leading
to the use of additional explanatory factors for the expected return. For example, it is common practice to
include the company’s size and the book-to-market equity ratio (BE/ME) (Fama and French, 1993; Carhart,
1997) in these market models.
As pointed out in the literature though, there are a number of difﬁculties with estimating counterfactual
returns using out-of-sample data in long-run event-studies. The approach requires that the estimated parame-
ters remain time-invariant, an assumption that is known to not hold (Harvey, 1989). Additionally, estimation
of the market-model parameters in the pre-event period must be done over an interval that is free of unusual
pre-event returns, perhaps owing to the event. A solution to this problem is to estimate the market-model
parameters using data from a long time (perhaps several years) prior to the event. But doing so exacerbates
the ﬁrst problem – that the market-model parameters may have changed – and leads to a new one: stocks that
were not listed during the estimation window will be excluded from the analysis. As a result of these, and
other concerns, the traditional methodologies developed for short-run studies are rarely used for long-run
examinations.
A common approach for computing abnormal returns in long-run event-studies involves the use of ref-
erence or “benchmark” portfolios matched on a ﬁrm’s characteristics (see Barber and John D. Lyons, 1997;
Lyon et al., 1999; and Brav, 2000). The advantages of this approach are that the benchmark can be con-
structed in-sample and that it allows for shocks occurring by chance that affect ﬁrms with similar character-
13istics. We employ this approach, matching every ﬁrm in our sample to a portfolio of ﬁrms in the same size-
decile.24 As a probe for robustness we have also used the CRSP equally-weighted NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ
index as a benchmark, comparing ﬁrms both in the same size decile and in the same one-digit SIC industry.25
A second commonly used approach in long-run event-studies is the calendar time portfolio (CTP) ap-
proach developed by Jaffe (1974) and Mandelker (1974) and advocated by Fama (1998). For each calendar
month we compute the return of an equally-weighted portfolio of companies that unionized in the last T
months, where T is either 18 or 24 in our study. The return of this “unionization portfolio” is denoted Rut,
where u indicates that the portfolio consists of companies where workers voted for unionization and t de-
notes the calendar month. The unionization portfolio is rolling, because companies with new unionization
events are added in any given month, while ﬁrms without a unionization event within the last T months are
dropped. The Fama-French three factor model (Fama and French, 1993) is used to compute the abnormal
return of this portfolio:
Rut −Rft = au+bu(RMt −Rft)+suSMBt +huHMLt +eut, (2)
where Rft is the one-month treasury bill rate, RMtis the monthly return on a value-weight market portfolio
of NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks, SMB is the difference in the returns on portfolios of small and
big stocks (below or above the NYSE median), and HML is the difference in the returns of portfolios of
high- and low-BE/ME stocks.26 In practice, Equation 2 is estimated by weighting the number of equities in
the RMt portfolio at time t, as suggested by Fama (1998). Assuming that the broad-market return and the
Fama-French factors adequately describe average returns, the parameter of interest, au, can be interpreted as
the average abnormal return associated with holding this simulated portfolio.
The CTP methodology has been used in many long-run event-studies, for example Loughran and Rit-
ter (1995), Brav and Gompers (1997), Mitchell and Stafford (2000), and Greenstone et al. (2006). This
approach is thought by some, including Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000), to have better statis-
tical properties than leading alternatives. For example, ﬁrms clustered in event-time can lead to over-stated
24CRSP produces indices for such purposes. Speciﬁcally, every year CRSP allocates companies into one of ten size deciles, based
on market-value. The value-weighted average return of securities in these deciles are then calculated on a monthly basis. CRSP also
produces a cross-walk that allows one to link each security to the appropriate size decile.
25We cannot match on the book-to-market equity ratio, as many studies do, because this variable is unavailable for a large number
of companies in our sample, especially in the earlier periods.
26The three factors, RMt, SMB, and HML, were taken from Kenneth French’s web page
(http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html). The web page contains additional information
on the construction of these series.
14test statistics in the matched-portfolio approach described above.27 Since the CTP methodology uses a
time-series of portfolio returns, cross-correlations of ﬁrm abnormal returns are incorporated in the portfolio
variance. Additionally, this approach allows for classical statistical inference because the distribution of the
estimator is well-approximated by the normal distribution (Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). A disadvantage to
this approach is that the market-model parameters of the portfolio are assumed constant. But, because the
model is estimated over a long time-period (1961-1999) and because the ﬁrms in the portfolio are changing,
that assumption is unrealistic.
A complication arising in both methodologies is how one deﬁnes the “event.” The appropriate event
is the date on which most of the information on the probability of future unionization is incorporated. For
much of the sample (1961-1976) we only observe the month that the NLRB closed the case. While we have
a well-deﬁned event, it is not the only relevant event and it may not be the most important one. Alternative,
potentially important events are the petition and election dates. Using post-1977 data, where both the election
and case closure calendar dates are available, we ﬁnd that the median time between the election and NLRB
case closure is ten days. In some cases, typically when one of the parties issues a challenge, this gap can be
considerably longer. In 5 percent of the elections it took at least six months for the NLRB to close the case.
While we do not have data on when the petition was submitted to the employer, it is known from Roomkin
and Block (1981) that elections usually occur very soon after the petition. In their sample, 42 percent of
elections occurred within one month of petition and 83 percent within two months. Therefore, we do not
believe that using the month the NLRB closed the election presents serious problems for estimation if most
of the new information is revealed at or after the petition date. To assess whether gradual diffusion of news
led to abnormal returns prior to the closing date it is useful to examine a long pre-event window. We believe,
however, that it will be difﬁcult to empirically distinguish the market’s anticipation of unionization from an
inadequate comparison portfolio.
The event-study method can inform us on how the equity value of ﬁrms responds to certiﬁcation elec-
tions. We can also estimate event-study models for elections with varying degrees of union support in order
to explore heterogeneity in the effect size. A more complete investigation of heterogeneity in the impact of
certiﬁcation elections on stock market performance involves estimating the post-event cumulative abnormal
return for every election and relating these to the vote share in a ﬂexible way. We conduct this analysis to
27Though, it should be noted, we will allow for such correlations in computing standard errors by clustering on election and
calendar month, using the formula from Cameron et al. (2006).
15examine the heterogeneity in the stock market reaction to election outcomes and to determine whether there
is a discontinuous relationship between cumulative abnormal returns and the vote share at the 50 percent
threshold.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Event-Study Estimates
In Figure 2 we plot the average cumulative return of union victory ﬁrmsagainst the average cumulative return
of the size-matched reference portfolios over the same time period.28 The ﬁgure reveals that both UV ﬁrms
and the corresponding reference portfolios have almost identical trends in returns prior to the union victory.
However, near the time of the election there is a pronounced downward break in the returns of UV ﬁrms
relative to the benchmark, persisting for approximately a year and a half. The average cumulative abnormal
return implied by this divergence is approximately -10 percent.
In order to assess the magnitudes and statistical signiﬁcance of the effect implied by Figure 2, in Figure
3, Panel A we plot ACAR(−24,t), for t = −24 through t = 24, with 95 percent point-wise conﬁdence in-
tervals. In Panel B we plot ACAR(0,t), for t =0 through t =24. This second panel is relevant for assessing
the overall effect size and for determining statistical signiﬁcance. The ﬁgures show that the downward shift
in abnormal returns emerging soon after NLRB case closure is statistically signiﬁcant. We can reject the
null hypothesis that the average abnormal returns are equal to zero ﬁve months after the event at a 5 percent
level of signiﬁcance. We interpret Figures 2 and 3 as providing evidence that union election wins correspond
to large negative abnormal returns.
Figure 4 contains the plot of the average cumulative return for union loss ﬁrms against the average
cumulative return of the size-matched reference portfolios. As with the UV ﬁrms, the reference portfolios
closely track the progression of UL ﬁrms prior to the election, but unlike UV ﬁrms, the returns of UL ﬁrms
do not diverge from the benchmark after NLRB case closure. If anything, there is a moderate increase in the
cumulative return of UL ﬁrms relative to the benchmark, though in Figure 5, which presents the difference in
these series with conﬁdence bands, we see this increase is not statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels.
We have conducted a variety of analyses to determine whether the patterns seen in Figure 2 and Figure
28For convenience, we will often refer to the event month as the “election month," though it should be understood that we actually
only know when the NLRB closed the case.
164 are robust. These analyses include: not imputing missing returns (Appendix Figures 1 and 7); using a bal-
anced panel (Appendix Figures 2 and 8); excluding elections where cumulative abnormal returns following
case closure are less than or equal to the 5th percentile or greater than or equal to the 95th percentile of all
post-event cumulative returns (Appendix Figures 3 and 9); using a four year pre-event window (Appendix
Figures 4 and 10); using an industry×size matched-reference portfolio (Appendix Figures 5 and 11); and
using the CRSP equally-weighted market index as the reference portfolio (Appendix Figures 6 and 12). In
all cases the overall pattern of cumulative returns look very similar to those seen in Figures 2 and 4.29
Table 2, Panel A presents average cumulative abnormal returns following union victories. The ﬁrst col-
umn corresponds to the use of the size-matched benchmark. Column (2) corresponds to the industry ×size-
matched benchmark. Column (3)corresponds tothe CRSPequally-weighted NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQindex
benchmark. In the ﬁrst row of Panel A we report ACAR(0,24) for each of the three benchmarks. The es-
timated post-election average cumulative abnormal returns range from -9 to -10 percent and are signiﬁcant
at the 1 percent level. To gauge magnitudes, we calculate that a 10 percent negative return corresponds to
approximately $20 million in lost market value (in 1998 dollars), or $40,522 per worker eligible to vote.
This appears to be a plausible value. Assuming that the entire proﬁt effect is coming about from an increase
in wages, the annual income of workers prior to unionization is $25,000 (in 1998 dollars), and a 6 percent
discount rate, the magnitudes are equivalent to a 10 percent union wage premium.30,31 Of course, we are
unable to say whether the loss in equity value reﬂects increases in compensation, beneﬁts, or inefﬁciencies.
In the second row of Table 2 we report ACAR(-24,-4), the average cumulative abnormal return prior
to case closure, excluding the three months immediately preceding the event. ACAR(-24,-4) is statistically
indistinguishable from zero in all three speciﬁcations. The lack of signiﬁcant abnormal returns prior to the
election indicates that the market did not anticipate these events, on average, and also suggests that all three
benchmarks do a reasonable job of predicting average returns of the portfolio of UV ﬁrms. In the third row
we compute ACAR(0,24) after adjusting abnormal returns in the post-event period for the equity-speciﬁc
trends in abnormal returns in the months before the election. Speciﬁcally, before computing ACAR(0,24)
we subtract the average abnormal return for the equity in months -24 through -7 relative to case closure
from the post-event abnormal return. The point estimates are very close to the unadjusted version. But, not
29A possible exception is Appendix Figure 10, which shows that UL ﬁrms experienced a period of positive abnormal returns three
years before the election.
30In 1980 (the mid-point of our sample frame) the average non union wage was $12.43 in 1998 dollars (Hirsch and Macpherson,
2008)(Hirsch and MacPherson 2008), translating to approximately $25,000 in annual income
31This premium is a lower-bound because approximately 25% of union election victories do not lead to contracts (Cooke, 1985).
17surprisingly, they are somewhat less precise. Table 2, Panel B reports the same set of estimates for union
loss ﬁrms. Consistent with what we observe in Figure 5, the cumulative abnormal returns are close to zero
and statistically insigniﬁcant.
One possible concern is that elections are endogenous to the performance of ﬁrms. However, we ﬁnd
little evidence that this is the case. The ﬁrms in our sample track their benchmarks quite closely prior to the
election, so it does not appear to be the case that the election is a result of the ﬁrms under- or over-performing
the benchmark. There is also no indication that the ﬁrm’s performance in the two years prior to the election
the union fares in the election. This can be seen in a number of ways. For example, looking at Figure 2,
winners and losers are not trending differentially prior to the election. To test this hypothesis more directly
we have regressed the union vote share in the election of the cumulative abnormal return from -24 to -4 and
found no signiﬁcant relationship between the two variables.32 If workers are deciding on the performance
of the ﬁrm, they are basing their decision on forecasts of future performance rather than past performance.
While we cannot rule out this possibility, it is not obvious how workers could forecast future share prices of
the ﬁrm, and why it would be optimal for them to ignore past performance. Moreover, it is not clear why it
would be optimal to unionize when the ﬁrm is projected to perform poorly.
Our sample selection scheme was partly predicated on choosing elections where a sizable fraction of the
ﬁrm’s workforce was voting: in practice we used a 5 percent cutoff. As a falsiﬁcation exercise we examine
elections where a small fraction of the ﬁrm’s total workforce voted. The idea is that we should not see effects
in ﬁrms where only a very small share of the employees voted. In Table 3 we examine whether cumulative
abnormal returns following an election become more pronounced when a larger share of the ﬁrm’s workforce
is participating. Speciﬁcally, using the full sample of elections we relate ACAR(0,24)i, where i denotes an
election, to the share of the ﬁrm’s total workforce in the bargaining unit. As seen in Column (1) of Panel A,
when the union wins the election and the fraction of the ﬁrm’s workforce in the bargaining unit is essentially
zero, the ﬁrm experiences a small and positive abnormal return. As we would expect, as the share of the ﬁrm
involved in the election increases, the resulting effect on the abnormal return becomes more pronounced.
Each percentage point increase in the share of the ﬁrm’s employees voting in the election is associated with
a third of a percentage point decline in the post-event cumulative abnormal return, a relationship which is
statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. In Column (2) we use adjusted-ACAR(0,24) and the relation-
32Speciﬁcally, we estimate a coefﬁcient of -0.006 with a standard error of 0.09. This estimate is not sensitive to the pre-event
window over which the CAR is calculated.
18ship continues to hold. Panel B presents these estimates for the union loss sample. The negative relationship
in the post-event cumulative abnormal return and the share of the workforce voting is not present. In fact,
there is a positive relationship, which is what we would expect if union losses resulted in positive abnormal
returns.
Finally, Table 4 presents the estimates from the calendar time event-study methodology. The portfolio
of stocks consisting of all ﬁrms with a unionization win in the previous 24 months has a precisely estimated
alpha of -0.005 (t-ratio=-3.6). In the second row we consider a hypothetical portfolio of ﬁrms that are
purchased two years prior to case closure and are sold four months prior to case closure (-24 to -4 months
relative to closure). This portfolio corresponds to a small and statistically insigniﬁcant alpha. Likewise, we
do not observe an economically or statistically signiﬁcant alpha for portfolios of ﬁrms recently experiencing
union losses (Table 4, Panel B), nor for portfolios consisting of ﬁrms with small elections relative to the size
of the company (Table 4, Panels C and D). These results give us conﬁdence in our ﬁnding: negative alphas
are only present when the union wins, and even then, only when the electorate is a large fraction of the ﬁrm’s
total workforce. Moreover, the results are robust to the use of two standard methodologies for long-run event
studies.
4.2 Discussion of the Results and Additional Analyses
Speed of Adjustment
Perhaps a surprising feature of Figure 3 is that, while the efﬁcient market hypothesis would predict the
entire unionization effect should be fully realized by the time of the election, we instead see an effect which
grows over a longer period, with an abnormal return beginning around the time of election and persisting
for approximately 15 months. Ours is not the ﬁrst study showing that markets under-react to seemingly
important events. Systematic under-reactions have been reported in response to IPOs and SEOs (Loughran
and Ritter, 1995), mergers (Asquith, 1983; Mitchell and Stafford, 2000), stock splits (Ikenberry et al., 1996),
share repurchases (Mitchell and Stafford, 2000), exchange listings (Dharan and Ikenberry, 1995), dividend
initiations (Michaely et al., 1995), spin-offs (Cusatis et al., 1993), earnings announcements (Ball and Brown,
1968), and predictable changes in demographics (Dellavigna and Pollet, forthcoming). While Fama (1998)
questions the robustness of some of these ﬁndings, even he acknowledges that the short-term continuation
of returns documented by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) is “an open puzzle,” and that the slow post-earnings
19announcement drift “has survived robustness checks, including extension to more recent data.”33
Hong et al. (2000) show that stock prize momentum is largely conﬁned to smaller stocks, so perhaps it
is not surprising that there is a gradual-adjustment following an union election win as our sample selection
ensures that the ﬁrms in our sample are relatively small. Hong et al. (2000) theorize that stock prices exhibit
momentum because information, especially negative information, diffuses gradually to investors. To exam-
ine whether the slow diffusion of information explains the speed of adjustment of stock prices in our study
we follow their example and compare ﬁrms with and without analyst coverage.
According to I/B/E/S International analyst data, only 50 percent of the ﬁrms in our sample had analyst
coverage at the time of the election, meaning that these elections may not have been widely publicized or
followed.34 In Figure 6 we compare average cumulative abnormal returns for companies that did and did
not have analyst coverage at the time of the election. Companies with analyst coverage appear to have expe-
rienced negative abnormal returns earlier than those without analyst coverage. But even these experienced
a relatively slow-reaction to the event on average, suggesting that the lack of analyst coverage is not the
complete story.35
While we do not have an explanation for why the adjustment happens slowly in this case, it is true
that by deﬁnition these large unionization events are typically singular for a given ﬁrm. Investors may
simply not have known how to process this new information, and instead reacted primarily to news on
fundamentals. In Section 4.3 we will see that union wins are associated with a trend break in the growth rate
of these companies, as measured by assets, shareholder equity, and proﬁts – an effect that may not have been
immediately obvious to investors, but which may have become apparent over time.
Evolution of the unionization effect over time
Next we turn to the evolution of the effect over time. The DiNardo and Lee (2004) sample includes
elections beginning in 1984. It is possible that unions did not affect ﬁrm performance in this latter period,
while in earlier years the effects may have been more pronounced. In Figure 7 we compare the average
cumulative abnormal return of UV ﬁrms for elections occurring in the 1961-1983 period to those occurring
33Quoted in Fama (1998).
34The 50 percent ﬁgure is derived from I/B/E/S International analyst data for years 1976-1999.
35We are aware that companies not appearing in I/B/E/S may still have analyst coverage. This kind of misclassiﬁcation tends
to reduce the measured difference in excess returns between these two groups of ﬁrms, if in fact there are actual differences. It
is unlikely that this measurement problem will affect the relatively slow speed of adjustment for companies covered by analysts,
as these are presumably measured correctly, meaning that our basic conclusion–that analyst-covered companies exhibit a relatively
slow speed of adjustment–still holds.
20in the 1984-1999 period. The ﬁgure indicates that the average effect of a union certiﬁcation win on ﬁrm
performance has remained fairly stable over time. Therefore, we do not believe that the lack of an estimated
unionization effect in DiNardo and Lee (2004) is due to their sample frame.36
4.3 Compustat Analysis
The results presented up to this point suggest that union victories are associated with negative abnormal re-
turns. We complement this analysis with an additional investigation of accounting variables. Using quarterly
data from Compustat, we examine whether shareholder equity, assets, total liabilities/total assets (a measure
of leverage), plant, property and equipment, sales, the dividend ratio, Tobin’s average Q, proﬁt margins, and
returns on assets are affected by the outcome of representation elections. We compute the average value of
these variables (logged when appropriate) over the twelve quarters before and after the event date, comparing
UV and UL ﬁrms.37 As before, we assess whether these series were trending differentially prior to the event
and whether their trend breaks around the time of the event. While we regard this analysis as informative, we
are cognizant that the coarseness of these data means that it is more challenging to assess the speciﬁcations,
as compared to the event-studies, because the pre-event window are shorter.
Unfortunately, the early part of the sample period is unusable in the Compustat analysis because many of
these variables were not reported until the late 1960s, and not universally until the early 1970s. Moreover, the
fraction of missing observations is substantially higher in the Compustat dataset than in the CRSP dataset.
As a result, for this analysis we will only consider elections over the 1973-1999 period. In order to mitigate
composition bias to due to unbalanced panels we de-mean the variables, but do not drop elections with
missing values.
In the nine panels of Figure 8 we plot averages of the de-meaned variables over event-time, in each
case comparing elections where the union won to those where the union lost. The ﬁgures show that the
time pattern of variables proxying for “size” are consistent with the pattern in equity value. UV ﬁrms
display a downward break in trend in total assets (Panel A), shareholder equity (Panel B), and sales (Panel
36We have also compared the effects for states with and without right-to-work laws. Conditional on a union winning its election,
the stock-market effects of unionization tend to be more pronounced in states with right-to-work laws than those without. This
ﬁnding does not mean that states with right-to-work laws are more favorable to unions – these ﬁrms differ in other dimensions,
and it is also probable these laws (or the business climate more generally) affect the likelihood that a union organizes, as well as
the likelihood that a union wins an election. The result does call into question though, whether right-to-work laws fundamentally
weaken unions because of a potential free-riding problem. This ﬁnding lends qualiﬁed support to the conclusion of Farber (1984)
and Moore and Newman (1985) that right-to-work laws are primarily symbolic, reﬂecting a taste against union representation rather
than having any real effect.
37All variables in 1998 dollars, when appropriate.
21C) near or just before certiﬁcation. The reduction in asset growth is, in large part, due to reduced growth
in plant, property, and equipment (Panel D).38 The smaller sample sizes mean these series are not as well-
behaved as those for equity values, though they have a similar pattern. We see little effect of union wins on
the measure of leverage, deﬁned as long-term debt divided by total assets (Panel E). This last ﬁnding can be
viewed as circumstantial evidence that companies are not using leverage strategically to inﬂuence bargaining
negotiations, at least in this sample.39
The marked reduction in the growth rate of assets is notable because if unionization increases the price
of labor, there should be substitution from labor to capital (though, as seen in Panel F, Tobin’s average
Q appears stable). The fact that assets are actually declining implies that the “scale” effect from reduced
reinvestment dominates the possible substitution effect. The time pattern of these variables also sheds light
on the seemingly slow reaction of investors to unionization events that we see in Figure 3. The pattern of
abnormal returns mirrors the time-pattern weobserve in shareholder equity, assets, sales, and pre-tax income.
The evidence is consistent with the stock market pricing the effect of unionization only after changes in these
variables become known.
While the reduced relative size of the UV ﬁrms is associated with lower pretax income (Panel G), vari-
ables that proxy for operating performance, for example return on assets and proﬁt margins, appear stable.40
At ﬁrst blush, the ﬁnding that companies that undergo unionization experience lower growth rates but stable
returns on assets and proﬁt margins may seem puzzling. But if ﬁrms only select projects that are sufﬁ-
ciently proﬁtable and unionization reduces the number of these high net present value (NPV) projects, then
it is possible for the company’s growth rate to decline in spite of experiencing no change in its operating
performance.
In Table 5 we present difference-in-difference estimates for the effect of a union victory relative to a
union loss on each of the six aforementioned variables. The sample consists of election × event-time
observations. We regress each of the (non-demeaned) variables on election ﬁxed-effects, an indicator for
whether the NLRB closed the election on or after the given quarter (“post"), and the interaction of “post"
with an indicator for whether the union won the election (“post × union win"). The point estimates suggest
38We have also examined the corresponding ﬁgures using a balanced panel. The overall patterns are the same as when using the
unbalanced sample, but because we lose so many elections the conﬁdence intervals are substantially wider.
39Bronars and Deere (1991) show there is a positive association between ﬁnancial leverage and unionization in the cross-section.
Matsa (2006) provides evidence that ﬁrm measures of leverage were affected by state-level changes in right-to-work laws.
40The proﬁt margin in UV ﬁrms appears to decline a bit relative to UL ﬁrms, but not until about seven quarters after the election
(Panel I).
22that assets, shareholder equity, and sales fall by approximately 10 percent in UV ﬁrms after the election,
relative to UL ﬁrms. Pre-tax proﬁts of UV ﬁrms are approximately 17 percent lower in the post-election
period relative to the pre-election period (relative to UL ﬁrms). These statistically signiﬁcant estimates are
consistent with the 10 to 14 percent negative abnormal returns we observe in equities.
4.4 Heterogeneous Impacts of Unionization
In view of the ﬁndings summarized in the preceding discussion, a natural question comes to mind: how can
these large effects be consistent with the substantially smaller ones found in DiNardo and Lee (2004)? This
sections aims at providing a partial answer to this question.
While DiNardo and Lee (2004) identify the “unionization effect” by focusing on an implicit comparison
of winning and losing establishments among close elections, we can learn how unions affect ﬁrms by exam-
ining the heterogeneity in the effects of unionization at all points in the vote share distribution. This analysis
is possible because of the long-panel structure we have at our disposal.
Webegin by relating the security-level cumulative abnormal return in the twoyears following the election
to the union vote share. Speciﬁcally, we are interested in the shape of E[CAR(0,24)i|vi], where vi denotes
the union vote share in election i. We graphically plot this function by: (1) averaging CAR(0,24)i over 20
equally-spaced vote share bins41 and (2) plotting the predicted values from the model E[CAR(0,24)i|vi]=
p(vi)+b1(vi > 0.5), where p( ) denotes a sixth-order polynomial and 1(vi > 0.5) is an indicator function
for whether the union vote share in a given election exceeded 50 percent. Figure 10 presents estimates of
E[CAR(0,24)i|vi] using both of these approaches. (For reference, Figure 9 shows the histogram of the union
vote share variable.)
Figure 10 shows clear evidence that the effect of a certiﬁcation election is heterogeneous, and that it
depends on the union vote share. As in the Dinardo and Lee study, there is no discernible discontinuity in
the E[CAR(0,24)i|vi] at the 50 percent union vote share threshold. In fact, the estimated discontinuity is
somewhat perverse: ﬁrms with close union wins experience elevated post-election cumulative returns vis-a-
vis ﬁrms with close union losses. On the other had, union victories with higher union vote shares correspond
to negative excess returns, and the negative impact of a union election win appears to become markedly more
pronounced when the union has a higher vote share. A greater than 60 percent union vote share is associated
with negative cumulative abnormal returns of 20 to 30 percent.
41See DiNardo and Lee (2004) for a description of construction of these 20 equally spaced bins.
23Firms with union losses also exhibit a downward sloping relationship between abnormal returns and vote
share. Much of the decline appears to occur at the largest vote shares, but there is also greater variability in
the predicted cumulative abnormal returns due to small sample sizes. Close union losses are associated with
marginally-signiﬁcant negative abnormal returns, though as we will show, these declines can be explained
by a small amount of pre-election trending in the abnormal returns.
We now turn to several robustness checks. In Figure 11 we overlay the predicted CAR in months 0
through 24 (shown in Figure 10) with the predicted CAR computed over event-months -24 to -4. The ﬁgure
shows that the gradient in CAR by vote share, seen for months 0 to 24, is not present for months -24 through
-4. This plot reassures us that the negative CAR observed for higher union vote shares is not a continuation
of a pre-event trend.
In order to address the issue of pre-event trends more completely, we consider an additional analysis
where we adjust abnormal returns in the post-event period for possible pre-event trends. Speciﬁcally, we
calculate the cumulative abnormal return in the post-event period deviated from the average abnormal return
in the pre-event period (from months -24 to -7 relative to case closure):
adjusted-ARit ≡ ARit −
1
18
−7
å
t=−24
ARit
We then calculate:
adjusted-CAR(0,24)i ≡
24
å
t=0
adjusted-ARit.
Figure 12 plots the predicted adjusted-CAR with 95 percent pointwise conﬁdence intervals.42 The ﬁgure
shows virtually the same pattern of heterogeneity seen in the earlier ﬁgures, though with wider conﬁdence
intervals. Themain difference between the pattern in this ﬁgure and Figure 10 is that there is weaker evidence
here of a negative CAR among ﬁrms with close union losses.
In Table 6 we conduct formal statistical inference. Using the same sample of 1,436 elections used to
construct Figure 10, in Column (1) we regress CAR(0,24) on a dummy for whether the union won the
election. Consistent with earlier analyses, we ﬁnd that union wins are associated with cumulative abnormal
returns that are 12.1 percentage points lower than ﬁrms with union losses (t-ratio = -3.5). In Column (2)
42As before, the abnormal returns from the pre-event period are calculated using an estimation window that ends 29 months prior
tothe closing month. Theabnormal returns from the post-event period arecalculated using an estimation window that ends 5 months
prior to the closing month.
24we add the union vote share as a covariate.43 The introduction of this variable alone is enough to change
the sign on the coefﬁcient of the union win dummy, resulting in a union effect of 0.048 (t-ratio = 0.89).
Adding higher-order polynomial terms in the vote share (Column 3) only makes the estimated union win
coefﬁcient more positive; the “regression discontinuity" estimate of a union win is 8 percentage points, but
is statistically indistinguishable from 0. In Column (4) we examine whether the negative gradient between
CAR and the vote share differs among elections where the union won and lost. Speciﬁcally, we regress
CAR(0,24) on a union win indicator, the vote share, and the vote share interacted with the win indicator. The
interaction term is statistically insigniﬁcant in all speciﬁcations.
In Columns (5)-(8) we estimate the same set of models using CAR(-24,-4) as the dependent variable.
None of the patterns observed when using CAR(0,24) as the dependent variable are evident here. In Columns
(9)-(12) we re-estimate these models using adjusted-CAR(0,24) as the dependent variable. The point esti-
mates in this set of speciﬁcations are very close to the ones obtained using CAR(0,24), but are less precise,
with standard errors approximately 50 percent larger than those in Columns (1)-(4).
5 Interpretation and Policy Implications
In this section, we investigate what our empirical results could imply about the potential effect of a policy
that makes it easier for workers to unionize. An example of such a policy shift can be seen in the Employee
Free Choice Act, recently proposed legislation that is meant to amend the National Labor Relations Act.
Speciﬁcally, one of the provisions of the legislation would allow employees to authorize a union via “card
check”, a showing that the majority of the workers signed cards to authorize a union, without having to win
certiﬁcation via a secret-ballot election process. It is widely believed that the legislation, supported by the
AFL-CIO, would make it much easier for workers to unionize, if it were to become law.
In essence, we view such a policy change as a ceteris paribus marginal increase in the probability of
unionization. One way to conceive of such an exogenous increase, would be to consider the thought experi-
ment of lowering the necessary vote share threshold for certiﬁcation. After all, the card check process is not
unlike the petitioning that constitutes the ﬁrst step in the NLRB election process.
As a thought experiment, consider lowering the threshold from 50 percent to say, 45 percent. One
conjecture is that such a policy change would only effect those ﬁrms with vote shares between 45 and 50
43Vote share is grouped into one of 20 equally spaced bins, ranging from 0 to 1. We transform this variable in order to avoid the
“integer” problem described in DiNardo and Lee (2004).
25percent, and that the effect could be approximated by the RD estimate. The shortcoming of this conjecture
is that it assumes that unions, ﬁrms, and workers do not respond to the increased ease of unionization. As
we noted in the introduction, Friedman (1950) suggested that unions might be forced to moderate promises
to raise wages when seeking the support of their workers. In a representation election, this might mean
moderating wage expectations to increase their chance of winning. With these forces at work, an exogenous
increase in the probability of a union victory could very well lead unions to be more aggressive, resulting in
increased negative impacts on proﬁtability – not just for those ﬁrms near the 50 percent threshold, but also
for those where the union won by a wider margin. Exogenously easing the unionization process might also
affect the outcome for ﬁrms that eventually do not unionize, through union threat.
Thus, in order to make quantitative predictions regarding the impacts of making unionization easier –
predictions that both use the magnitudes we estimate, and allow for behavioral responses to a change in
policy – it is necessary to adopt assumptions about the behavior of unions and ﬁrms and how proﬁtability
is affected by changes in the probability of unionization. We consider a “median voter”-type model of
endogenous union determination. The basic idea of the model is that in anticipation of the representation
election, the ﬁrm and the union each propose an outcome (e.g. a wage level), and voters, recognizing that
wages can be both too low or “too high” (if it poses too large a risk of job loss), vote on the two choices
in the election. Both the union and the ﬁrm face similar trade-offs: the union (ﬁrm) would beneﬁt from
higher (lower) wages, but proposing those wages loses votes among those workers who have more moderate
preferences.
We present a parsimonious parameterization for the model, and then calibrate it by choosing parameters
such that the model produces both an equilibrium vote share distribution and event-study estimates that most
closely match that which we observe in the data (shown in Figure 12).
This calibrated model yields a distribution of voter preferences, and also allows us to simulate the effects
of lowering the vote share threshold, a policy which exogenously increases the probability of unionization.
We also assess the model’s predictions for the impact on equity value of two sub-populations, a marginal
group (the ﬁrms that are not currently unionized, but would be in the new regime), and two inframarginal
groups (ﬁrms that are either already unionized or not unionized, and whose status does not shift after the
policy change).
265.1 Endogenous Voting Model
There are surely an unlimited number of distinct ways to model the interaction between unions, workers,
and ﬁrms in an election context. Arguably, an obvious starting point is to adopt a “textbook” model of
electoral competition.44 Indeed, median voter-type models have previously been considered in the theoretical
literature on unions (see Atherton, 1973; Farber, 1978; and Booth, 1995).45
We assume there are three optimizing entities involved in a representation election, the workers, the
union, and the management.46
Workers: Each worker is assumed to maximize their own individual utility, and faces the decision
to either vote for or against union recognition. In doing so, each forward-looking worker compares the
anticipated outcome if the union wins to the expected outcome if the union loses. For example, the main
issue could be wages, where the anticipated wage level is higher if the union prevails in the election than if
it fails. Workers will not always vote for higher wages, because it may also carry a higher risk of job loss as
the ﬁrm must respond to those higher wages. So for each worker, there is an “ideal wage” or a “bliss point”.
It is most natural to discuss workers’ (and unions) preferences over wages, beneﬁts and other working
conditions. But as long as improved (inferior) compensation and conditions lead to lower (higher) proﬁts
for the ﬁrm, we can equivalently consider workers’ and unions preferences over proﬁt levels, by applying an
appropriate monotonic transformation from wages, for example, to proﬁts. In the discussion below, we use
this equivalent formulation, focusing our attention on “proﬁt levels” (strictly speaking, the change in stock
market value of the ﬁrm).
Thus, the actions of the workers are summarized by the probability of the ﬁrm winning the election
P(pM,pU)
where pM is the resulting anticipated proﬁt level if the ﬁrm wins, and pU is the anticipated level if the union
wins. ¶P
¶pM and ¶P
¶pU are both negative: as the outcome under a ﬁrm victory becomes more “extreme” and more
proﬁtable to the ﬁrm, fewer workers ﬁnd that outcome attractive, lowering the chance of an electoral victory
44See Persson and Tabellini (2000) for a guide to models of this sort.
45Interestingly, this model has many parallels to the model of ﬁnal offer arbitration developed in Farber (1980). The two bargain-
ing parties face the same trade-offs as the union and ﬁrm do here, and the role of arbitrator is played by the median voter in this
context.
46The setup is similar to Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969) who also consider management, workers, and unions as separate maxi-
mizing entities.
27for the ﬁrm. Conversely, if the anticipated proﬁt level is more moderate, the “middle” of the electorate
gravitates towards voting for the ﬁrm. The same is true for the union: the ﬁrm has a lower chance of winning
if the outcome under a union victory pU (which will always be less than pM) is higher (and hence more
moderate).
Note that we assume a probabilistic voting model (e.g. workers, ﬁrm, and union cannot perfectly pre-
dict the outcome) as is common in many electoral competition models. It will be clear that without some
uncertainty, there can be no equilibrium where pM  = pU. Thus, introducing some uncertainty as to the exact
location of the median voter expands the range of possible equilibria.
Management: The ﬁrm inﬂuences the anticipated result of a ﬁrm electoral victory. Essentially, they
propose a proﬁt level pM in order to maximize expected proﬁts
pM  P(pM,pU)+pU  (1−P(pM,pU))
taking the union’s proposal as given. The management faces a clear trade-off: higher proﬁts are desired, but
proposing an outcome that leads to higher proﬁts raises the chance that the workers will vote to unionize,
which would lead to lower proﬁts.
In this sense the model captures the possibility of “union threat”, where the presence of unions can
compel ﬁrms to offer above-market wages, even if the workers ultimately do not unionize.
Union: The union faces a similar problem with similar trade-offs. It controls anticipated outcome pU
under a union victory. Essentially, they make a proposal pU to maximize the objective function
U  P(pM,pU)+U (pU)(1−P(pM,pU))
taking pM as given. U is the level of utility the union obtains if it loses the election, and U (pU), which is
decreasing in pU, is obtained if the union prevails. We assume that for all the feasible pU, U ≤U (pU), so
that the union would never prefer to lose the election. Again, the union beneﬁts from a lower-proﬁt outcome
if it prevails in the election. But it must also take into account that the further away their proposal is from
the median worker, the more likely the less desirable outcome pM will occur.
28Equilibrium: We consider the Nash Equilibrium, which is characterized by the ﬁrst order conditions
P(pM,pU)+
¶P(pM,pU)
¶pM
(pM −pU) = 0 (3)
¶U (pU)
¶pU
(1−P(pM,pU))+
¶P(pM,pU)
¶pU
 
U −U (pU)
 
= 0
The solution to this system yields equilibrium proposals for pU and pM as well as the equilibrium probability
P(pM,pU).
Finally, we introduce two elements of heterogeneity to make it possible for the model to generate a
relationship between the vote share and the observed proﬁt level. First, we allow for heterogeneity across
workplaces in the preferences of the workers (i.e. the median voter): heterogeneity in P(pM,pU). Second,
we allow for heterogeneity in preferences among workers within each workplace. It is possible to include
this kind of heterogeneity without affecting the speciﬁcation of P(pM,pU) and hence the equilibrium pM and
pU, but without some heterogeneity, realized vote shares could only equal 1 or 0.47
5.2 Parameterization and Estimation
Our policy extrapolation exercise requires us to parameterize the model. We choose the following functional
forms.
1. In bargaining over wages, proﬁts are bounded. We let p be the maximum feasible proﬁts, given the
constraints of the market. For example, p could be the proﬁt level if the post-election wage equaled
the competitive market wage. If ﬁrms are price takers in the labor market, then any wage below that
level would mean that they could not hire any workers and would be forced to shut down.
2. We letU (pU)=−
 pU
c −1
 2, which is representative of the entire class of concave quadratic functions
in pU.48 c is the union’s “ideal” proﬁt level. We also set U = U (p) so that the union gains exactly
nothing if it wins the election but achieves a wage level no different than the market competitive wage.
3. Voters ideal proﬁt levels (“bliss points”) are uniformly distributed over the interval [m −e −s,m −e],
where m varies across workplaces and s quantiﬁes the degree of heterogeneity of voter preferences
47If all voters had the same ideal proﬁt level as the median, then either all workers will vote for or against the union.
48A quadratic function has three parameters, but the expected utility is invariant to afﬁne transformations, so that it is innocuous
to rescale and shift the function so that the peak of the function equals zero, and that the function equals -1 when pU = 0. This is
therefore a one-parameter function.
29within the workplace. e is a stochastic component, uniformly distributed on [0,le], reﬂecting the un-
certainty that both union and ﬁrm face regarding the exact location of the workers. If individual work-
ers’ utility over p are symmetric around their bliss point, this implies that the vote share for the union
willbeVS= 1
s
 pM+pU
2 −(m −e −s)
 
, and that P(pM,pU)=Pr
 
VS < 1
2
 
= 1
le
 
m − s
2 −
 pM+pU
2
  
.49
This speciﬁcation satisﬁes the above assumption that as the ﬁrm or union raises its proposal, the prob-
ability of a ﬁrm victory declines.
4. m isdistributed across workplaces, such that −m follows anexponential, F
 
x;lm,m
 
=1−exp(−lm (x−
m)) for x−m ≥ 0, and 0 otherwise. The distribution of m thus has a long left tail, and a maximum at
m.
To summarize, the model contains 6 parameters in total, m,lm,le,s,p,c. m,lm characterize how worker
preferences are approximately distributed across workplaces, le quantiﬁes the degree of uncertainty of the
precise location of the voters’ preferences, and s quantiﬁes heterogeneity in workers’ preferences within a
ﬁrm. p represents the limit on how low the ﬁrms’ wages can be, and c is the union’s “ideal” proﬁt level.
These six parameters are sufﬁcient for generating a joint distribution of pobs (an event-study estimate
of the impact of the union on the ﬁrm) and the vote share in favor of the union, the two variables that
we observe in the data. Speciﬁcally, a m is drawn from the distribution given by the parameters m,lm.
Conditional on this value of m, and the remaining 4 parameters (le,s,p,c), the ﬁrm and the union make
optimal proposals according to the marginal conditions in 3. Subsequent to these optimal choices p∗
M and
p∗
U , an e is drawn and the VS is determined as above, and the observed proﬁt level is given by pobs =
p∗
U  1[VS > .5]+p∗
M  1[VS < .5].
At the same time, the model has a minimal number of parameters. There is one parameter for the union’s
objective function (c), one for the ﬁrm (p), and two parameters for the distribution of worker preferences
across ﬁrms (m,lm). Without allowing for le, there would be no uncertainty in the precise location of voters’
preferences, which would imply that the ﬁrm’s and union’s proposals could never be different in equilibrium.
Finally, without s, a vote share would never be anything except 0 or 1.
49Additionally, VS and P(pM,pU) must be between 0 and 1.
30To calibrate this model, we choose parameters that most closely generate 1) the pattern of event-study
estimates in Figure 12, and 2) the distribution of vote shares. Speciﬁcally, we minimize the quadratic form
f (q)
′ ˆ V−1f (q), where f (q) =

 
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 
 
 
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and q is the vector of parameters from the model, the expectations are the moments predicted by the model
given q, and the ˆ as are the corresponding observed moments. ˆ a1 is the event-study estimate for all union
victories, ˆ a2 is the event-study estimate for all union losses, ˆ a3 and ˆ a4 are the event study estimates close
to, and on either side of, the 50 percent union vote share threshold, and ˆ a5 and ˆ a6 are the ﬁrst and second
moments of the vote share.50 pobs is the change in market value predicted by the model and VS is the
predicted vote share for the union. ˆ V is the estimated variance-covariance matrix of these 6 estimators.
Although our model is parsimonious and we chose simple functional forms (e.g. uniform distributions
for e, the distribution of voter preferences, and quadratic utility), it leads to somewhat complicated (and not
particularly illuminating) analytic expressions for the theoretical moments in f (q). Therefore, we estimate
the parameters via Monte Carlo simulation. For each set of parameter values, we take 50000 Monte Carlo
draws of m and e, and for each of those draws compute pobs and VS as described above. We then use that
simulated data to compute the theoretical moments in the same way the observed moments are calculated.
Before reporting the results, we provide some intuition as to how various parameters would affect the
theoretical moments. First, as the distribution of m (given by the parameters m and lm) shifts in the negative
direction, one can expect pobs to become more negative, as both ﬁrm and union proposals respond to the
location of m. Second, p is essentially an upper bound to the union and ﬁrm proposals, so decreases will
generally lead to lower pobs as well. Third, a very small s implies that workers within a ﬁrm have very
similar preferences, and therefore will vote similarly, implying that the only observed vote shares would be
close to either 0 or 1. If s is very large, then vote shares would be clustered around an intermediate value.
50Speciﬁcally, ˆ a3 and ˆ a4 are the values of the regression prediction on either side of the 50 percent threshold, from a regression
of pobs on a quartic in the vote share and a dummy variable for the vote share being greater than 50 percent.
31Fourth, a very small le, which would represent very little uncertainty in the distribution of voters, would
lead union and ﬁrm offers to converge towards each other. If the proposals are virtually identical, then we
would expect no discontinuity in the event-study estimate with respect to the vote share.
Finally, we recognize that the observed data on pobs and VS does not reveal the magnitude of c in any
obvious way. For example, given the ﬁrst order condition in 3 and quadratic utility function, a less negative
c would raise the marginal gain to the union of lowering an offer, but at the same time it would increase the
potential penalty of losing the election; this suggests an ambiguous impact of c on pobs.51 For this reason,
we investigate the extent to which our qualitative results are sensitive to the value of c by estimating the
remaining 5 parameters, conditional on varying values of c.
5.3 Results and Policy Extrapolation
We estimate the model by minimizing the quadratic form described above. In doing so, we discovered
that the objective function was virtually ﬂat with respect to the parameter c, and that the estimated ﬁve
parameters were not sensitive to the magnitude of c. For example, estimating the full six-parameter model
gave estimates of c= −17.20, p =0.042, m =0.339, lm =7.80, s = 0.311, le =0.101, whereas estimating
the remaining 5 parameters conditional on ﬁxing the value of c at −2.29 yielded p = 0.043, m = 0.343,
lm = 7.90, s = 0.314, le = 0.102. We concluded that c was not well-identiﬁed, and therefore we report the
results from ﬁxing c at −2.29.52
To illustrate the ﬁt of the model, we generated simulated data according to the estimated parameters.
Figure 13 shows a histogram of simulated equilibrium vote shares. Overall, the distribution shares a similar
shape to the actual distribution of vote shares in Figure 9. As expected – since the estimation procedure only
used the ﬁrst two moments – there are some notable discrepancies. First, the simulated data yields a ratio of
union losses to victories is about 2 to 1, compared to the actual ratio of about 2.5 to 1. Second, the simulated
data produced no observations with vote shares above 83 percent, whereas Figure 9 shows a small number
of cases in that upper tail.
The ﬁt of the model can also be seen in Figure 14, which provides the predicted change in market value,
51Adding to the ambiguity of how c might affect the equilibrium offers is the fact that c is a lower bound on both union and ﬁrm
offers.
52−2.29 seems to be the lower bound on the change in market value (relative to the broad market index): historically, over an
18 month period, the most the broad market index has ever increased has been 129 percent. Since an individual ﬁrm’s stock price
cannot lose more than 100 percent of its initial value, we take as the most negative excess returns to be -229 percent. Fixing c to be
half of that value (−1.15) has almost no effect on the magnitude of the remaining parameters.
32as a function of the observed vote share, using the simulated data. The ﬁgure gives the same overall shape as
that in Figure 12, with the union effects ﬂat and near zero to the left of the 50 percent vote share threshold,
and a negative slope to the right of the threshold. In our judgment, while this ﬁve-parameter model certainly
does not capture every feature of the observed data, it does seem to provide a reasonable approximation.
Importantly, our modest “calibration” exercise of this electoral competition framework suggests that
unions are responding to workers’ preferences. Using the simulated data, the regression of the union offers
on the expected median position (m − s
2 − le
2 ) yields a coefﬁcient of 0.734. Furthermore, our model suggests
that ﬁrm and union offers are generally more “moderate” than the positions of the median voter. Figure 14
plots the average realized position of the median (m − s
2 −e) worker by the realized vote share using the
simulated data. It shows that when the union loses, the median worker’s ideal proﬁt is higher than the ﬁrm’s
offer, while the worker’s ideal level is more negative than what the union offers, when the union prevails in
the election.
The simulation results also provide insights into worker preferences. The simulations imply that the
distribution of worker preferences for higher compensation is highly skewed left. The 50th percentile of the
median voter distribution (across ﬁrms) has a median voter with a preference for the change in equity value
of positive 4.6%. At the same time, 25 percent of median voters have preferences that are more negative
than -4.3%, while 5% have preferences for the change in equity value of less than -24%. This distribution
suggests that the taste for large compensation packages amongst workers considering unionization is present
in only a small number of establishments. We can think of these preferences as related to the establishment’s
elasticity of labor demand in the sense that workers are willing to accept larger compensation packages when
demand is more inelastic and when their jobs are not at risk. From this perspective these simulations imply
that the great majority of establishments undergoing elections have fairly elastic labor demand.
For the policy simulation we hold all of the parameters ﬁxed at their estimated values, and c at -2.29, and
then vary the threshold for a union election win. Changing the threshold alters the probability P(pM,pU) in
our model. For example, if the threshold is 25% of afﬁrmative votes required to unionize, then the probability
of a ﬁrm victory becomes P(pM,pU) = Pr
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. We then conduct a Monte
Carlo simulation with 50,000 draws to compute the equilibrium union and management offers, and the union
vote share distribution. We view this analysis as applicable to proposals that would make it easier for unions
to organize workers, such as EFCA. Under the EFCA scenario there would no longer be elections, but it is
arguably still true that we can view workers as deciding between two options (sign card or not), which is not
33unlike an election with a low union vote threshold. As in our model, ﬁrms and unions would try to inﬂuence
that decision. Our policy simulation yields predicted effects of making it marginally easier to unionize (as
indexed by the fraction that would win certiﬁcation).
In Table 7 we present the results from the policy simulations. The columns represent different scenarios
according to the union vote share threshold for certiﬁcation. The population is split into ﬁve mutually
exclusive groups, represented by the rows. Each sub-group will either be all unionized or not, depending
on the scenario, as indicated by the labels “YES” and “NO”. In the “Proportion” column, it is seen that as
the threshold decreases, more and more elections result in a union win. For example, a 25 percent threshold
corresponds to a (33+37+15=) 85 percent union win rate while a 50 percent threshold corresponds to a 33
union win rate.
The ﬁrst row shows the predicted average percentage change in market value for the entire population for
the different scenarios. Note that here we include both sets of establishments (winners and losers) because
the model allows for management the vary their offers in response to a union threat and because lowering the
threshold changes the composition of establishment in each category, as more establishments are unionizing.
We ﬁnd that a more than doubling of the union win rate (from 33 to 70 percent, as we move from the 50
percent to the 33 percent vote share threshold), leads to an overall decrease in equity value of about 4 percent.
If the union vote share threshold were lowered to 10 percent, it would increase the proportion unionized to
0.99, and the simulation predicts a further 6.6 percent decline (from -0.058 to -0.124) in equity value.
Our fully speciﬁed model allows us to examine the main sources of these changes. We are able to
examine the changes for the sub-groups deﬁned in the second through sixth rowsof Table 7. Wepoint to three
general patterns. First, as we lower the vote share threshold, the market value change of the group of ﬁrms
that would continue to lose under the new scenario remains fairly stable. Indeed the group in the second row
(“Inframarginal Loss”) experiences no change in market value. This pattern is consistent with management
not being highly responsive to increased union threat as a result of the policy change. By contrast, we do see
important changes in equity value among “inframarginal” unions who are already victorious with the higher
threshold. This can be seen most clearly in the “Inframarginal win” row of Table 7, where the union effect
drops from -0.117 to -0.153, moving from the 50 percent to the 33 percent threshold. This negative equity
effect falls to -0.205 when the threshold falls to 10 percent, which according to the simulation would mean
nearly the entire population would be unionized. Finally, we observe that when a marginal group shifts from
the union losing the election to it winning the election there is a signiﬁcant reduction in the market value of
34the ﬁrm. We note that each time this occurs, the change in the marginal group (ranging from -0.08 to -0.10)
is reasonably approximated by the the estimated RD estimate using the simulated data (also is in the -0.08 to
-0.10 range), which is shown in the last row of Table 7. Thus, one reason to be cautious about the simulated
overall effect is that it is to some extent being driven by the simulated RD estimate, which is somewhat larger
than the point estimates we obtain from the actual data.
There are other reasons for caution in making these policy predictions, particularly because of our choice
of model. For example, we are not modeling which establishments hold union representation elections in the
ﬁrst place. It is possible that lowering the threshold for unionization will change the composition of which
establishments hold elections. We speculate that the marginal ﬁrms induced to hold an election by the policy
change would be ones where wage demands are relatively weak in the ﬁrst place, since one could argue that
the cost of holding an election outweighed the potential beneﬁts to the union.
A perhaps more fundamental concern is that our conclusions are made through the lens of a model of
electoral competition. Butitispossible that workers are not voting oncompensation packages, andhence that
unions and management are not acting strategically to inﬂuence the vote. In this case, we might expect to see
the observed relationship between the vote share and the change in the market value because unions require
widespread support in order to be effective, for example to impose a credible strike threat. Distinguishing this
model from the one we propose would involve examining the employment changes following representation
elections. One prediction of a model of electoral competition is that there should be limited employment
effects from new unionization, something that we view as plausible given the results in DiNardo and Lee
(2002, 2004). Exploring this further would be a fruitful avenue for future research.
We are not aware of any other attempt to estimate the impact of policies that ease unionization. Thus, in
spite of the above caveats, we believe that our modeling and simulation exercise, which is disciplined by the
magnitudes we ﬁnd in our event-study and RD analyses, provides a useful benchmark for policy predictions.
6 Conclusion
The economic effects of unions on the labor market and the economy have been a longstanding area of
interest for economists. The literature has considered the impact of unions on wages, their potential role as
monopolies, their role in work stoppages, their effect on the aggregate economy, as well as the question of
how they can even exist and survive in a competitive labor market. In order to even partially address many
35of these questions, we must ﬁrst understand how unions affect ﬁrms.
We began by asking whether the case of National Linen Services was the rule or the exception. In one
respect, it is the rule. We have shown that among publicly traded ﬁrms where the workforce attempting to
organize is not too small, new unionization is associated with a reduction in the ﬁrm’s market value, in a
way that parallels the experience of NLS. Like the NLS case, the stock market reaction to union victories is
somewhat slow, as has been found in a number of other event-study contexts. This ﬁnding is robust to the
use of a variety of speciﬁcations and to the use of several different methodologies. The negative effects
of unionization on the equity value of ﬁrms appears fairly stable over time, showing no major differences
before or after 1984. An examination of accounting variables of both sets of ﬁrms reveals that union wins are
associated with relatively lower growth, though there is little evidence to suggest that these ﬁrms experienced
lower return on assets or proﬁt margins as compared to ﬁrms with union losses. The evidence is therefore
consistent with the claim that unionization reduces the number of sufﬁciently positive NPV projects available
to a ﬁrm.
In another respect, however, the case of NLS is a clear exception. By two years after the union victory,
NLS stock had earned negative 75 percent abnormal returns. By contrast, for our sample we estimate ab-
normal returns of about negative 10 percent, and our sample is somewhat representative of publicly-traded
ﬁrms at risk of unionization. Based on the market capitalization of these ﬁrms, this 10 percent equity loss
translates to a total loss of about $40,500 (in 1998 dollars) per voter. Since this amount represents a combi-
nation of a transfer to workers as well as lost proﬁt due to inefﬁciencies caused by the union, one can view
this magnitude as an upper bound on the redistributive effect or the efﬁciency effect.53 For example, if the
true average union wage effect is 8 percent and if our back-of-the-envelope calculation (that a $40,500 loss
would translate to a pure transfer equivalent to a 10 percent wage premium) is correct, then this would imply
a 2 percent loss in terms of efﬁciency due to unions.
The large difference in magnitude between the case of NLS and the estimated average effects serves to
highlight the importance of heterogeneous effects, which we carefully document in our analysis. Using a
different sample from DiNardo and Lee (2004), we also ﬁnd RD estimates that imply unionization is largely
ineffective for ﬁrms where there is more moderate support for unions, at least to the extent that unions do not
affect a ﬁrm’s equity value. This ﬁnding can be reconciled with the ﬁndings from the event-study analysis
53Treating this magnitude as an upper bound requires assuming that unions can only impose efﬁciency costs, and cannot lead to
increases in proﬁtability (after netting out compensation costs).
36through the negative gradient in abnormal returns in relation to the union vote share.
Finally, we consider a voting model of endogenous union determination, and calibrate it with the mag-
nitudes we ﬁnd in our empirical analysis to make a ﬁrst-cut prediction on the likely impact of policies that
increase likelihood of unionization. Policy simulations show that easing the threshold necessary to gain
recognition would not lead to union threat effects (ﬁrms losing value by having to respond to the threat of
unionization), but would cause unions to use this increased voter slack to be more aggressive. While the
RD estimates reasonably approximate effects for small policy changes, the approximation leads to a increas-
ingly larger understatement of the effects of larger policy shifts. Our exercise suggests that a policy-induced
doubling of unionization would lead to a 4.3 percent decrease in the equity value of all ﬁrms at risk of
unionization.
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41Data Appendix
This Appendix describes how we match establishments in the NLRB data to ﬁrms in the CRSP database.
When matching we looked for similarities in the name listed in the NLRB election ﬁle to names that were
ever present in the CRSP ﬁles. To this end, we created two data sets: one containing the company names in
the NLRB election ﬁle and the other containing every company name that has ever appeared in the CRSP
database.54 This second data set will be hereafter referred to as the “master names ﬁle." In addition to the
company names, the master names ﬁle also contains a unique company id, the “PERMNO”, which allows
for further matching to the CRSP and Compustat databases.
There are 195,889 certiﬁcation elections in the NLRB data set that could potentially be matched to
companies in the master names ﬁle. Because the matching process is tedious, and must almost entirely
be done manually, we excluded any election with less than 100 voters. This resulted in 24,709 ﬁrms in
the certiﬁcation election ﬁle that potentially matched ﬁrms in the master list of CRSP company names.55
These elections are comprised of 61 percent of all workers eligible to vote in NLRB certiﬁcation elections.
Using this smaller subset, ﬁrms in the election ﬁle were compared to ﬁrms in the master CRSP ﬁle using the
matching algorithm employed by DiNardo and Lee (2004), which makes use of the SAS SPEDIS function.
The algorithm matches company names in the NLRB ﬁle to company names in the master names ﬁle based
on a so-called “spelling distance,” which considers those comparisons with a spelling distance above a pre-
determined threshold as candidate matches.56 The algorithm may match a company in the election ﬁle to
more than one company name in the CRSP ﬁle. In these cases we selected the lowest spelling distance as
the candidate match. If there was a tie in spelling distance between two candidate comparisons, we selected
one match at random.
Because we matched ﬁrms on names only, manual inspection of the matches revealed that our automated
procedure resulted in many matches that were obviously incorrect. Therefore, research assistants reviewed
54Many companies have multiple names.
55Because a ﬁrm can have multiple elections, this number includes multiple cases of the same ﬁrms. There are 18,344 unique
ﬁrm spellings, though there are fewer unique ﬁrm names because of misspellings and abbreviations.
56We refer the reader to DiNardo and Lee (2004) for further details on this algorithm. That study relied heavily on the establish-
ment’s street address, which is unavailable here. Therefore, the spelling distance threshold was quite speciﬁc to that application. As
a ﬁrst pass, we modiﬁed the program to match only on ﬁrm name, and discovered that in this application, that same threshold led to
“too many” matches. As we describe below, we therefore augmented the process with a manual review.
42every match and dropped those where they judged the two ﬁrm names as different companies.57,58 We then
collected all of the unmatched companies in the election ﬁle, from the initial set of 24,709, and attempted to
locate each one inDunandBradstreet’s Million Dollar Directory andthe Lexis/Nexis’ Directory ofCorporate
Afﬁliations for the year of election. This step identiﬁed subsidiaries of publicly traded parent companies,
and allowed us to spot companies that were dropped erroneously in the previous step.
We ultimately matched 7,693 elections from the NLRB election ﬁle to companies in the CRSP master
ﬁle. In 1,579 cases, the ﬁrm in the CRSP ﬁle was not publicly traded at the time of the election. After
excluding the private ﬁrms, our ﬁnal sample contained 6,114 elections, consisting of 20 percent of allworkers
eligible to vote in NLRB elections.
In order to determine whether the matches appeared reasonable, we compared the reported two-digit
SIC industry code and the state of the establishment from the election ﬁle to the corresponding variables in
the CRSP and Compustat ﬁles, for industry and state respectively. Because companies are diversiﬁed, the
main SIC code for a company in the CRSP database need not be the same as the SIC code for a particular
establishment in the NLRB election ﬁle. Similarly, an establishment may not be located in the same state
as the company’s headquarters. However, the comparisons are reassuring: the two digit SIC codes in the
two data sets are the same for 50 percent of the matches, while 40 percent of the matches show the same
state. For reference, if we randomly pair companies from the ﬁnal NLRB data set to companies in the master
names ﬁle that were never matched to the NLRB data through our procedure, the corresponding match rate
is 5 percent for industry and 4 percent for state.
57For example, the algorithm determined that any company in the election ﬁle with the word “American” as part of its name was
a sufﬁciently good match for the company “American Enterprises” in the CRSP ﬁle, if a better match did not exist. Therefore, a dis-
parate set of companies like “American Laundry,”“American Envelope,”and “Pan American Screws” were all matched to “American
Enterprise.”All of these matches were dropped by our research assistants.
58Because there was an element of judgment, these exclusions were recorded in a log ﬁle for replication purposes.
43Figure 1:  Cumulative stock market returns surrounding National Linen Service’s 1999 
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Figure 2: Average cumulative returns of union victory firms and of the size-matched reference 
portfolio, by month relative to NLRB case closure 
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Note: Union victory firms consist of publicly traded companies holding representation elections where at least 5% of the 
company’s workforce voted, and where the union won.  Each point is the average cumulative return up to the month relative to 
case closure, beginning 24 months prior to case closure.  Each firm in the sample is associated with a benchmark portfolio 
matched on size.  The benchmark series corresponds to the average cumulative return of these size-matched reference portfolios.  
Returns are expressed net of the risk-free rate.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 3: Average cumulative abnormal return of union victory firms, by month relative to NLRB 
case closure 
Panel A: Beginning 24 months prior to case closure 
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Panel B: Beginning month of case closure 
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Notes:  Both panels show the difference in the average cumulative return of union victory firms and the size-matched reference 
portfolio, as shown in Figure 2.  Panel A corresponds to the average cumulative abnormal return computed beginning 24 months 
prior to case closure.  Panel B corresponds to the average cumulative abnormal return computed beginning in the month of case 
closure.   The dashed lines represent the 95% confidence intervals, which are computed using standard errors clustered on 
elections and calendar months.  We use the formula in Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2006) to compute standard errors with 
multi-way clustering.     
  
Figure 4: Average cumulative returns of union loss firms and of the size-matched reference 
portfolio, by month relative to NLRB case closure 
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Note: Union loss firms consist of publicly traded companies holding representation elections where at least 5% of the company’s 
workforce voted, and where the union lost.  Each point is the average cumulative return up to the month relative to case closure, 
beginning 24 months prior to case closure.  Each firm in the sample is associated with a benchmark portfolio matched on size.  
The benchmark series corresponds to the average cumulative return of these size-matched reference portfolios.  Returns are 
expressed net of the risk-free rate.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 5: Average cumulative abnormal returns of union loss firms, by month relative to case 
closure 
Panel A: Beginning 24 months prior to case closure 
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Panel B: Beginning month of case closure 
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Notes:  Both panels show the difference in the average cumulative return of the union loss portfolio and the size-matched 
reference portfolio, shown in Figure 4.  Panel A corresponds to the average cumulative abnormal return computed beginning 24 
months prior to case closure.  Panel B corresponds to the average cumulative abnormal return computed beginning at the month 
of case closure.   The dashed lines represent the 95% confidence intervals, which are computed using standard errors clustered on 
elections and calendar months.  We use the formula in Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2006) to compute standard errors with 
multi-way clustering.     
 Figure 6: Average cumulative abnormal return, by analyst coverage 
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Note: A company is considered to have analyst coverage if it appears in the I/B/E/S dataset in the year of the 
election.  The sample is limited to elections occurring in years where I/B/E/S  data were available, between 1976 and 
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Figure 7: Average cumulative abnormal return, by time period of election 
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Figure 8:  Compustat variables; Union victory/loss comparisons 
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Notes:  The sample consists of publicly traded companies with elections taking place between 1973-1999 where at 
least 5% of the workforce voted.  Lines with circles correspond to union victory companies.  Lines with diamonds 
correspond to union loss companies.  All variables are drawn from the Compustat quarterly database.  Each variable 
is demeaned, where the mean is taken within each election panel.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 9: Histogram of the union vote share  
0
5
0
1
0
0
1
5
0
2
0
0
F
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
.025 .075 .125 .175 .225 .275 .325 .375 .425 .475 .525 .575 .625 .675 .725 .775 .825 .875 .925 .975
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 10: Cumulative abnormal returns in the two years after NLRB closes election, by relation to 
vote share 
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Note: Abnormal returns are the simple difference in the security’s return and the size-matched benchmark portfolio 
in the same month.  Cumulative abnormal returns are the sum of the abnormal returns over a two year period 
beginning in the month of case closure.  Predicted values are calculated using a sixth-order polynomial, and an 
indicator for whether the union won.  Dashed lines are the 95% confidence interval.  Dots are the average 
cumulative excess return in 20 equally spaced bins.  See Section 4.4 for further details on the construction of this 
figure.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 11: Cumulative abnormal returns in the pre- and post-event periods, by relation to vote 
share 
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Notes: Predicted values are calculated using a sixth-order polynomial and an indicator for whether the union won.  
The solid line corresponds to the predicted cumulative excess return in the two years following case closure, 
conditional on union vote share.  The dashed line corresponds to the predicted cumulative abnormal return 
calculated starting 24 months prior to the election through four months prior to case closure, conditional on union 
vote share.  See Section 4.4 for further details on the construction of this figure.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 12: Cumulative adjusted abnormal returns in the two years after NLRB closes election, by 
relation to vote share 
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Notes:  Adjusted-cumulative abnormal returns are cumulative abnormal returns that have been adjusted for security-
specific pre-election trend in abnormal returns.  See Section 4.4 for details on the construction of this variable.  
Predicted values are calculated using a sixth-order polynomial and an indicator for whether the union won.  Dashed 
lines are the 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 13: Histogram of simulated equilibrium vote shares 
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 Figure 14: Predicted change in market value, as a function of the observed vote share, using the 
simulated data 
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 Table 1: Summary Statistics 
  At least 5% of workforce voting    Less than 5% of workforce voting 
   Union wins  Union loses    Union wins  Union loses 
Number of elections  414  1022    1163  2682 
 
Vote share for union  0.62 0.35    0.64 0.35 
 [0.11]  [0.10]    [0.13]  [0.10] 
 
Number of voters  449.1 454.2    276.5 297.6 
 [534.9]  [558.5]    [263.4]  [301.6] 
 
Number eligible  496.0  494.0    286.4  317.9 
 [649.3]  [638.9]    [286.1]  [330.4] 
 
Fraction of employees voting  0.21  0.23    0.01  0.01 
 [0.21]  [0.21]    [0.01]  [0.01] 
 
Year of election  1975.2  1976.9    1974.9  1976.6 
 [9.17]  [9.11]    [9.24]  [9.42] 
 
Fraction in Manufacturing  0.78 0.75    0.79 0.81 
          
 
Number of employees  3813.3 3430.8    68468.6  75284.6 
 [5377.5]  [5195.4]    [134336.5]  [123610] 
          
 
Market Value (CRSP)  353.8  330.9    4734.1  6350 
 [880.3]  [783.8]    [10,547]  [13,660] 
 
Market Value (Compustat)  308.7 329.80    6334.1  7580.9 
 [614.9]  [799.0]    [13372.0]  [16,343.1] 
 {0.34}  {0.33}    {0.76}  {0.78} 
 
Shareholder equity  242.6  233.2    4991.7  4479.8 
 [433.0]  [497.7]    [13859.3]  [9432.4] 
 {0.34}  {0.31}    {0.77}  {0.77} 
 
Total Assets  588.4  683.8    13974.4  14164.9 
 [1243.3]  [1876.5]    [36396.5]  [33308.0] 
 {0.37}  {0.31}    {0.78}  {0.79} 
 
Total Liabilities/Total Assets  0.060 0.068    0.062 0.071 
 [0.118]  [0.162]    [0.112]  [0.183] 
 {0.58}  {0.44}    {0.55}  {0.60} 
 
Pretax income  15.11  9.76    249.3  276.3 
 [46.97]  [41.9]    [731.7]  [731.1] 
 {0.35}  {0.36}    {0.74}  {0.74} 
 
 
 Table 1 (cont.) 
  At least 5% of workforce voting    Less than 5% of workforce voting 
  
Union victory 
(UV firms) 
Union loss 
(UL firms)   
Union victory 
(UV firms) 
Union loss 
(UL firms) 
 
Sales 160.7  144.2    2693.5  3041.2 
 [238.7]  [225.1]    [5306.3]  [5534.1] 
 {0.33}  {0.31}    {0.80)  {0.80} 
 
Tobin's Q  1.17  1.30    1.29  1.31 
 [0.658]  [0.694]    [0.642]  [0.625] 
 {0.44}  {0.50}    {0.48}  {0.56} 
 
Profit margin  0.069  0.060    0.084  0.084 
 [0.119]  [0.167]    [0.073]  [0.074] 
 {0.44}  {0.50}    {0.46}  {0.52} 
 
Income/Employees  0.004 0.003    0.004 0.004 
 [0.023]  [0.008]    [0.006]  [0.007] 
 {0.41}  {0.49}    {0.48}  {0.51} 
 
Return on Assets  0.013  0.022    0.026  0.027 
 [0.051]  [0.037]    [0.023]  [0.027] 
 {0.48}  {0.53}    {0.47}  {0.25} 
 
Dividend Ratio  0.633  0.259    1.15  0.941 
 [3.42]  [1.100]    [6.99]  [11.02] 
   {0.44}  {0.50}    {0.58}  {0.59} 
 
Fraction of stocks delisted  0.10 0.08    0.049  0.028 
          
Notes:  Summary statistics are based on the NLRB election, Compustat, and CRSP data.  Standard deviations 
are in brackets.  For Compustat variables, the average percentile rank, relative to all Compustat companies in the 
year and quarter of the election, are in braces.  Market value, shareholder equity, total assets, pretax income, and 
sales are in millions of dollars.  Summary statistics for market value are derived from both the CRSP and 
Compustat databases.  These measures differ because there are more missing values in the Compustat database.  
Fraction of stocks delisted is computed as the fraction of stocks with a non-missing delisting return in a two year 
window surrounding the NLRB case closure month.  Profit margin = pre-tax income/sales.  Dividend ratio = 
dividends/pre-tax income. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Table 2:  Estimates of post-election cumulative abnormal returns 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 
Size-matched 
benchmark 
Size × industry-
matched 
benchmark 
Broad-market 
benchmark 
Panel A: Union Victory        
 
ACAR(0,24)  -0.092 -0.096 -0.103 
 (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.029) 
 
ACAR (-24,-4)  -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 
 (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020) 
 
Adjusted- ACAR (0,24)  -0.100  -0.103  -0.111 
 (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.042) 
Panel B: Union Loss       
 
ACAR (0,24)  0.029  0.020  0.016 
 (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.022) 
 
ACAR (-24,-4)  0.034  0.004  -0.009 
 (0.022)  (0.014)  (0.014) 
 
Adjusted- ACAR (0,24)  0.029  0.016  0.028 
   (0.030)  (0.032)  (0.031) 
Notes: ACAR(X,Y) denotes the average cumulative abnormal return from month X to month 
Y relative to the NLRB case closure month.  There are 414 elections in the sample in Panel 
A, and 1022 elections in Panel B.   See Section 3.2 for details on the construction of the 
benchmark portfolios and estimation.      
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3:  Relating post-event cumulative abnormal returns to the 
share of the workforce in the bargaining unit 
 
(1) 
ACAR(0,24) 
(2) 
Adjusted- ACAR 
(0,24) 
Panel A: Union win     
    
Constant 
0.03 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
 
Share of workforce in 
bargaining unit 
-0.31 
(0.08) 
-0.26 
(0.13) 
Observations 1577  1577 
Panel B: Union loss     
    
Constant 
0.03 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
 
Share of workforce in 
bargaining unit 
0.06 
(0.05) 
0.17 
(0.08) 
Observations 3704  3704 
Note: Sample includes all NLRB elections that we matched to publicly traded 
firms.  See note to Figure 2 for details on how ACAR(0,24) and Adjusted-ACAR 
(0,24) were constructed.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Table 4: Fama-French calendar time Portfolio estimates 
 
Panel A: Union Win Portfolio (≥5% sample) 
Event-window: Alpha  MKTRF  HML  SMB 
(0,24)  -0.0051  0.909 0.421 1.12 
  (0.0014)  (0.035) (0.054) (0.048) 
(-24,-4)  -0.0015  0.996 0.487 1.14 
  (0.0015)  (0.038) (0.062) (0.054) 
 
Panel B: Union Loss Portfolio (≥5% sample) 
Event-window: Alpha  MKTRF  HML  SMB 
(0,24) -0.0001  1.04  0.469  1.01 
  (0.0017)  (0.031) (0.048) (0.043) 
(-24,-4)  -0.0005  0.970 0.264 1.04 
  (0.0011)  (0.020) (0.040) (0.035) 
 
Panel C: Union Win Portfolio (<5% sample) 
Event-window: Alpha  MKTRF  HML  SMB 
(0,24) 0.0010  1.10  0.395  0.222 
  (0.0014)  (0.037) (0.055) (0.048) 
(-24,-4) -0.0009  1.10  0.283  0.373 
  (0.001) (0.026) (0.042) (0.037) 
 
Panel D: Union Loss Portfolio (<5% sample) 
Event-window: Alpha  MKTRF  HML  SMB 
(0,24) -0.0015  1.14  0.509  0.212 
  (0.0007)  (0.023) (0.035) (0.030) 
(-24,-4) -0.0009  1.10  0.220  0.335 
  (0.0008)  (0.017) (0.031) (0.027) 
Note:  The “≥5% sample” consists of elections where at least 5% of the firm’s workforce voted.  The “<5% 
sample” corresponds to elections where less than 5% of the firm’s workforce voted.  MKTRF  is the 
monthly return of the CRSP value-weighted NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ broad market index, SMB is the 
monthly return on the zero investment portfolio for the common size factor in stock returns, and HML is the 
monthly return on the zero investment portfolio for the common book-to-market equity factor in stock 
returns.  The unit of observation is the calendar month.  Observations are weighted by the number of firms 
in the event-window.       
 
 
  
Table 5:  Compustat Analysis 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
   ln(Assets) 
ln(Shareholder 
equity)  ln(PPE) ln(Sales)
ln(pretax 
income) 
Dividend 
Ratio 
Profit 
margin  ROA 
Tobin's 
Q 
Liabilities/ 
Assets 
                                
post 0.150  0.106  0.137  0.132  0.168  -0.197 0.0001  -0.004  -0.054  -0.001 
 (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.028)  (0.019)  (0.031) (0.118)  (0.002)  (0.001) (0.026)  (0.005) 
                   
post   -0.110  -0.098  -0.113  -0.077  -0.168 0.045  -0.005  -0.001  0.031  0.003 
× union win  (0.037)  (0.035)  (0.048)  (0.034)  (0.062) (0.263)  (0.003)  (0.002) (0.038)  (0.008) 
                   
Observations 14,319  16,220  14,223  17,028 14,042  6,127  14,585  13,960  14,035 5,791 
                   
R-squared 0.97  0.95  0.96  0.94  0.75 0.084  0.64  0.32  0.66  0.28 
Notes: Variables are derived from Compustat data; 1973-1999.  Each column corresponds to a different model estimated using OLS.  Standard errors 
clustered on election are in parentheses.  Observations are event quarter × firm cells.  The dependent variables are demeaned, where the mean is taken 
over all non-missing observations in an election panel.  Sample sizes vary due to the presence of missing values.   PPE stands for plant, property, and 
equipment.  ROA stands for return on assets.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Table 6: Cumulative abnormal returns and vote share 
   CAR(0,24):  CAR(-24,-4):  Adjusted-CAR(0,24): 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
Constant 0.029  -0.065  -0.075  -0.064 0.0003  -0.018 -0.029 -0.035  0.029 -0.024 -0.029 -0.002 
  (0.021) (0.030) (0.039) (0.035)  (0.016) (0.025) (0.033) (0.030)  (0.030) (0.045) (0.058) (0.053) 
                
Union  won  -0.121 0.048 0.080 0.049  0.003 0.037 0.021 0.027  -0.129  -0.032 0.035 -0.019 
  (0.035) (0.054) (0.066) (0.053)  (0.028) (0.046) (0.057) (0.047)  (0.051) (0.081) (0.101) (0.082) 
                 
Union won        -0.016       0.332      -0.439 
×vote share      (0.321)      (0.255)      (0.469) 
                 
vote  share   -0.616  -0.610   -0.123   -0.235   -0.353    -0.205 
   (0.160)  (0.207)   (0.126)   (0.162)   (0.233)    (0.301) 
                
p(vote  share)     X       X       X   
                
                
Observations  1436 1436 1436 1436    1436 1436 1436 1436    1436 1436 1436 1436 
Note:  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  The sample consists of all elections where at least 5% of the workforce voted.  The variable “vote share” 
denotes the union vote share, minus 0.5.  Following Dinardo and Lee (2004), the vote share is aggregated to 20 discrete bins.  The dependent variable is the 
cumulative abnormal return from months 0 to 24 relative to case closure (columns 1-4), the cumulative abnormal return from -24 through -4 months relative to 
case closure (columns 5-8), and the adjusted-cumulative  abnormal return from 0 to  24 (columns 9-12),.  See Section 4.4 for details on the construction of these 
variables.  The term p(vote share) denotes a fourth-order polynomial in the union vote share.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 7: Simulated Market Value Changes Under Different Vote Threshold Scenarios               
                       
Group Proportion Threshold=0.50   Threshold=0.33  Threshold=0.25   Threshold=0.10 
     Effect  Win?  Effect  Win?  Effect  Win?  Effect  Win?
                       
Overall  1.00   -0.015    -0.058    -0.083     -0.124  
                       
Inframarginal Union Loss  0.01   0.042 NO    0.042 NO    0.042 NO    0.042 NO 
                       
Marginal Group 1  0.13   0.042 NO    0.042 NO    0.042 NO    -0.062 YES 
                       
Marginal Group 2  0.15   0.042 NO    0.040 NO    -0.041 YES    -0.074 YES 
                       
Marginal Group 3  0.37   0.031 NO    -0.050 YES    -0.069 YES    -0.098 YES 
                       
Inframaringal union win  0.33   -0.117 YES  -0.153 YES   -0.171 YES    -0.205 YES 
                       
Simulated  Discontinuity      -0.080    -0.081    -0.082     -0.108  
                                      
 Note: Each column represents a different scenario for necessary union vote share necessary for certification. The population is split into five groups 
(represented by rows). "Inframarginal loss" denotes firms that would not be unionized under any scenario. "Inframarginal win" denotes firms that would be 
unionized under all scenarios. "Marginal Groups" denote firms in which unions would lose under one or more scenarios, but would win with a lower 
threshold (as indicated under the sub-column "Win?"). e.g. Marginal Group 3 comprises of firms where the union vote is marginally below the 50 percent 
when the threshold is 0.50; they would become unionized in any of the other scenarios. "Simulated Discontinuity" is the RD estimate - via a 4th order 
polynomial regression --  using the simulated data. 
 Appendix Figure 1: Average cumulative returns of union victory firms and of the sized-matched 
benchmark; non-imputed data 
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Appendix Figure 2: Average cumulative returns of union victory firms and of the sized-matched 
benchmark; Balanced panel 
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 Appendix Figure 3: Average cumulative returns of union victory firms and of the sized-matched 
benchmark; eliminate 5% most positive and 5% most negative post-event abnormal return 
elections 
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 Appendix Figure 4: Average cumulative returns of union victory firms and of the sized-matched 
benchmark; Four year pre-event window 
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 Appendix Figure 5: Average cumulative returns of union victory firms and of the industry×sized-
matched benchmark 
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 Appendix Figure 6: Average cumulative returns of union victory firms and of the CRSP equally-
weighted index benchmark 
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Appendix Figure 7: Average cumulative returns of union loss firms and of the sized-matched 
benchmark; non-imputed data 
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Appendix Figure 8: Average cumulative returns of union loss firms and of the sized-matched 
benchmark; Balanced panel 
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 Appendix Figure 9: Average cumulative returns of union loss firms and of the sized-matched 
benchmark; eliminate 5% most positive and 5% most negative post-event abnormal return 
elections 
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 Appendix Figure 10: Average cumulative returns of union loss firms and of the sized-matched 
benchmark; Four year pre-event window 
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 Appendix Figure 11:  Average cumulative returns of union loss firms and of the industry×sized-
matched benchmark 
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 Appendix Figure 12:  Average cumulative returns of union loss firms and of the CRSP equally-
weighted index benchmark 
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